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ABSTRACT
The rate of home ownership in the US had remained around 65% since the end of
the Second World War. Between 1994 and 2006 the rate of home ownership climbed to
69%. In 2006, the combined assets of the top 5 bank holding companies were $6 trillion.
Between 2007 and 2009 almost $2 trillion of bank assets evaporated as widespread
mortgage defaults triggered a crisis. The pressing question is why were so many bad
loans originated in the first place and what induced firms and investors to hold them?
The primary mortgage market is intensely regulated and the secondary market is
dominated by the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Therefore it is important to
examine the regulatory incentives to originate risky mortgages.

This dissertation looks at influence of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA,
1977) and the GSEs to originate and hold different kinds of mortgages. Chapter One
looks at the how the patterns of origination change for institutions subject to the CRA at
the time of a merger. Chapter Three estimates the propensity of lenders to retain or sell
their mortgages to GSEs and private institutions. Chapter Two links Chapters One and
Three by examining the effect of the CRA on securitization. The research shows that
institutions subject to the CRA lower their rates of denial and securitize more assets when
they plan to merge and are under community group pressure. The research also reveals
that the GSEs faced more competition after 2003 and as a result may have lowered their
lending standards by accepting loans with higher ratios of loan amount to annual income.
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Chapter Two shows that investors accepted loans originated in response to CRA
pressure without requiring a higher proportion of credit guarantees. This means that
market participants may not have been fully cognizant of how the riskiness of mortgages
changed in response to CRA pressure.

While many questions about the roots of the financial crisis are still to be
answered, the results presented in this paper indicate that regulation played a significant
role in altering the patterns and extent of origination.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2007 a wave of defaults on subprime loans left experts and laypersons
wondering what would induce a sophisticated financial market to create and hold
mortgages that gave every impression of being likely to default. There are many theories
about possible reasons. This dissertation contends that banks were induced to originate
risky loans to meet the requirements of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and that
the appetite of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) for risky loans lowered the cost
of origination to all institutions.

This dissertation will establish that the CRA influenced the origination patterns of
banks under community group pressure in the year preceding a merger. Previous studies
that looked at delays in the merger process and the profitability of banks with high CRA
scores miss the strategic behavior that banks engage in to avoid delays due to merger
protests. The research presented in Chapter One finds that the CRA is responsible for the
origination of at least an additional $114bn and possibly as much an additional $983.3bn
worth of loans between 2001 and 2006, depending on how many times the institutions
under community group pressure merged. Banks get CRA credit for originating and
purchasing, but not for holding, loans to lower income households in their community.
Chapter One leaves the question of what banks did with the originated CRA loans
unanswered. Chapter Two picks up this thread and presents evidence that banks were
able to securitize around a quarter of the loans originated for CRA purposes in the year
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preceding a merger. The findings presented in Chapter Three reveal that lending
standards, as measured the by ratio of the loan amount to income, were higher for private
purchasers than for GSEs.

The three chapters address the roots of the financial crisis by exploring the supply
of and demand for risky mortgages. The findings suggest that government regulation
influenced both sides of the market and therefore had a profound influence on the
quantity of risky loans in the financial market. The CRA alone could account for the
origination of as many as $983.3bn CRA mortgages. The lower bound on CRA related
mortgages is $141bn, which is still economically significant. The panel regression in
Chapter Two estimates that banks securitize $260 for every $1,000 worth of acquired
assets when they face a CRA exam the quarter before a merger. Chapters One and Two
together show that banks change their lending practices when they are both merging and
under CRA pressure and that they do not hold many of the loans they originate for CRA
purposes.

Chapter Three presents evidence that the GSEs are buying many of the risky
mortgages that banks are originating. Banks originate low and moderate-income (LMI)
loans to meet the requirements of the CRA and GSEs purchase LMI loans to fulfill their
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) goals. As the loan amount to
income value on a loan application rises it becomes more likely to end up on the balance
sheet of Fannie Mae than any other entity. The data presented in Chapter Three show

2

that although GSEs were privately owned institutions before 2007, non-market related
forces drive their performance. The 2003 surge in Fannie Mae purchases cannot be
linked to any observables in the applicant pool. The three chapters together present a
picture of the creation and flow of risky mortgages through the financial system. The
results show that from origination to purchase on the secondary market, regulation plays
an important role in determining the fate of home loan applications.

3

CHAPTER ONE

THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND HOMELOAN ORIGINATION: THE MERGER PROCESS AS A DISCIPLINING
MECHANISM AND THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY GROUPS

Introduction

In wake of the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, the Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) has attracted defenders and detractors alike. The strongest defense of the
CRA is the fact that a majority of subprime loans were originated by independent
mortgage companies, that are not subject to the provisions of the CRA (Yellen, 2008).
Chapter Three will deal with the incentives for all primary lenders to originate risky loans
by GSEs. This chapter looks at origination data for both mortgage companies and banks,
but I must stress that the comparison is not an exercise in accounting for subprime loans
by source.

The implications of the risk undertaken by banks differ from that of mortgage
companies with respect to macroeconomic stability. That is why the focus of the
research presented here is to understand through what channels the CRA exerts its
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influence on bank lending and the changes in lending it elicits. Specifically, I examine
the merger process and the role of community groups in that process. A bank is required
to fulfill the provisions of the CRA in order to merge, and community groups have the
right to protest a merger. The merger process is therefore an interesting theater in which
to observe how the interaction between banks and community groups precipitates
changes in lending practices. The “community” to which the provisions of the CRA refer
is defined geographically. However many protests to mergers are on the basis of racial,
not spatial, discrimination.

Using a panel of 162 banks, I examine how denials as a percentage of applications
for black applicants, white applicants and for applicants who conceal their race and
ethnicity respond to mergers, protests and community group pledges. Unlike previous
research in this field, I am able to observe the assessment areas and compare lending
within the assessment area to lending outside to determine to what extent the CRA leads
to localized changes or to a relaxation of overall lending standards. I indicate the
presence of community group pressure with a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a bank
has ever had to pledge to increase its CRA lending to a community group. The
origination of refinance loans is also examined to get an indication of how the CRA
influences the origination of risky mortgage products.

I find that merging banks that are under pressure from community groups
decrease the percentage of denials to black and white applicants as well as to low and
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moderate-income (LMI) households within their assessment areas. This change in
lending is overwhelmingly limited to the assessment area. Black denials decline by 10%
if a bank is merging and under community group pressure. White denials decline by
2.3% under the same conditions. I find that banks under community group pressure wait
until they want to merge to change their lending. There was no indication in the data that
banks “recycled” existing CRA loans by purchasing as opposed to originating new loans.
The origination of refinance loans increases by 4.3% if a bank under community group
pressure is planning to merge. In addition to this, banks appear to satisfy the terms of
their current CRA lending pledges to community groups by originating refinance loans.
Banks who make CRA pledges increase their origination of refinance loans by 5% if they
have made a CRA pledge in the current year. The interaction between the merger process
and community groups resulted in the origination of an additional $15.7 bn. worth of
loans to black applicants, $40.3 bn. worth of loan to white applicants and $85 bn. of
refinance loans, at the very least1. The maximum estimate is $94 bn. worth of loans to
black applicants, $242 bn. worth of loans to white applicants and $647 bn. of refinance
loans.

1

This estimate is based on the average loan amount for each category of lending between 2001 and 2006, an estimate of 350 banks
that are under community group pressure (Silver and Brown, 2007) and at least 1 merger per bank during the 6 year period in question
for the minimum and 6 mergers for the maximum amount.
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1. 1 The Regulatory Environment

1.1.1 The Community Reinvestment Act: History and Enforcement

The CRA was passed in 1977. The stated intention of the Act was to encourage
lending institutions to increase lending to their communities. The passage of the CRA
was a response to a pattern of bank lending activity known as redlining. Community
activists in Chicago in the 1960’s are credited with coining the term “redlining”. The
term refers to the practice of banks to avoid lending to poor and declining neighborhoods.
This practice is arguably a relic of the stringent standards set by the federally funded
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), established in 1933 as part of the New Deal.
Given that HOLC loans ceased in 1935, long before the passage of the CRA, this
contention is unlikely to be true. The law requires that lending be undertaken in a safe
and sound manner.

The provisions of the CRA were tightened throughout the 1990’s. Before 1995,
banks could earn good ratings by documenting their efforts to lend to low and moderateincome households. After 1995, banks were required to report their lending activities
within the assessment areas. Although no explicit benchmarks were provided, lending
could be compared across institutions and to previous assessments.

The changes made

in 1995 were believed to be so burdensome that in 2005 the asset size requirement for a
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large bank assessment was raised from $250 million for unaffiliated banks2 to $1 billion.
Banks with assets exceeding $250million and less than $1billion were the made subject
to requirements that were less burdensome than those on large banks (see below).

As a consequence of the CRA, banks are subject to routine assessments and are
assigned ratings based upon the extent to which they “met the needs of their assessment
area”. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) assesses national banks.
The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assesses thrifts and Savings and Loans.

The

Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) assesses state chartered banks. The FDIC assesses nonnational banks and banks that are not state chartered with federal deposits insurance.
Assessments are usually conducted every 2-3 years. The regulators are required to
consider public comments when ratings are assigned and when rendering a decision on a
merger application. The four possible ratings are: Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to
Improve, and Substantial Non-Compliance. A rating of at least satisfactory was required
if the bank’s application for ”a new deposit facility” was to be approved by the
regulators. A “new deposit facility” can be a new branch, a merger, or an acquisition.
The Act therefore influences banks’ lending choices by potentially limiting their ability to
expand. All depository institutions are subject to the provisions of the Act, including
wholesale and business banks. Wholesale and business banks are assessed according to
the extent of their community development lending.

2

A threshold of $1billion dollars was set for “conglomerated” banking institutions, presumably to deter the practice of creating
separate corporate identities to avoid the provisions of the CRA. (Federal Register, Vo. 60, no. 86, 1995 page 22178)
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The tests differ depending on the size of the bank. Banks are classified as small,
intermediate-sized and large. Small banks have assets valued at less than $250 million.
Intermediate-sized bank have assets exceeding $250 million, but less than $1billion.
Large banks have assets that exceed $1billion. Table 3 on page 21 summarizes the
frequency of examination types and scores. Small banks are assessed on 5 performance
standards. These standards are: (1) the loan to deposit ratio (2) percentage of credit
extended within the assessment area (3) credit extended to low and moderate-income3
(LMI) borrowers and small businesses and farmers (4) the geographic distribution of
loans and (5) actions taken in response to written complaints. Small banks are exempt
from the community investment and service requirements. The intermediate-sized bank
tests were introduced as part of the 2005 reform. Before 2005 banks whose assets fell
within this asset range were subject to the same tests as large banks. Intermediate-sized
banks are subject to a lending test similar to the one to which small banks are subject to.
In addition to the lending test, the community development investments and services of
intermediate banks are subject to community development tests. (CRA 101, Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco) Large banks are subject to 3 tests: a lending test, a
service test and an investment test. The investment test involves an examination of the
contribution of banks to affordable housing, community services and economic activity in
LMI neighborhoods.

3

Low and moderate income is defined as 50% or less and between 50% and 80% of the median household income for the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) respectively.
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The lending test is the most important component of the assessment.

Depending

on the nature of a bank’s operations, the proportion of loans by value and volume to
small businesses, small farms or loans to moderate and low-income households are
assessed. The values of these proportions are reported, but there are no explicit evaluation
benchmarks. The proportion of bank lending to LMI households is compared the size of
the LMI population in the assessment area and to the lending activity of banks with
similar size and assessment areas. A bank with an outstanding lending test can never
receive an overall rating that is less than satisfactory, regardless of how poorly it may
score on the other tests. The service test establishes whether or not there are enough
branches and ATMs to service the community as well as the innovativeness and ambition
of the bank’s community development services. Examples of community development
services include technical assistance to non-profit organizations, whose primary focus is
community development, serving on the board of an organization that furthers affordable
housing goals, and developing financial educational programs for LMI individuals. For
large banks, the lending test accounts for 50% of the CRA rating, while the investment
and service tests each account for 25% of the rating. Several revisions have been made to
the Act during its history; these are summarized in Table 1.1 and discussed below.
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TABLE 1.1
The Regulatory History of the CRA
Year

Regulation

Changes Made to CRA

1977

CRA

1989

Federal Institutions Recovery,

Required the public disclosure of CRA scores

Reform and Enforcement Act

and reports

-

(FIRREA)
1992
1994

Federal Housing Enterprises Financial

Required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to

Soundness and Safety Act

purchase and securitize mortgages

Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and

Relaxed restrictions on interstate banking and

Branching Efficiency Act

required banks applying for in-state branches to
have at least a satisfactory CRA rating

1995

Changes to the Code of Federal

Required CRA examinations to be more

Regulations

“performance” and less “procedure” oriented.
Effectively made CRA examinations more
stringent.

1999

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

Repealed the Glass-Steagall Act (1933),
thereby permitting commercial banks to offer
investment banking services and insurance
products to its clients. All commercial banks
applying to expand the range of products on
offer had to be CRA compliant. Required
banks to disclose the terms of all their
agreements with community groups.

2005

Small Bank Regulatory Relief Code

Less frequent and stringent exam for bank with

of Federal Regulations

less than $1bln worth of assets.
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In 1989, CRA ratings and reports were made public (see Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989). In 1995, the standards of compliance
were tightened. Before the changes of 1995, banks could satisfy the provisions of the
CRA by presenting their documented efforts to increase lending to the community. After
the 1995 tightening, banks were assessed on the basis of their ratio of lending within the
“assessment area” to lending outside that area (See below). The regulatory agency that
oversees a particular bank administers the assessment. An assessment is conducted
approximately every 3 years. In 1999, in response to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act4, the
CRA was expanded to require banks to be CRA-compliant if they desired to engage in
investment banking and insurance. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also required banks to
disclose written agreements between depository institutions and non-governmental
groups in connection with the CRA (See FRB regulation G).

The CRA requires that an assessment area must consist of whole “geographies”
and/or political divisions. This means it is a set of entire census tracts, the assessment
area cannot include only a portion of a census tract. (CRA §228.41 (a) through (e)) The
assessment area must include the census tracts in which its main office, branches and
deposit taking ATMs are located. In addition to these tracts, a bank must include the
tracts in which it has originated a “substantial portion” of its loans. Section 228 permits
banks to adjust the boundaries of their assessment areas to reflect the area which they be”
reasonably expected to serve.” Banks are therefore permitted to exclude portions of the
4

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act by allowing the same institution to engage in banking,
investment banking and insurance provisions
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cities and towns in which they have branches located. Census tracts with low median
income relative to the MSA may not be “arbitrarily omitted” if they are adjacent to the
bank’s assessment area. The larger the bank, the less likely it will be permitted to omit an
LMI tract. (CRA §228.41 (e)(3)) Banks define their assessment area, within the
provisions of the CRA, to maximize their rating5. Banks seek to include tracts into their
assessment area if it will improve their record of lending within the assessment area. In
order to do this they must document their growth history and plans within the area. 6
The fact that banks have some say in selecting their assessment areas makes the
assessment area itself endogenous. However, it should be noted that this flexibility is
limited. Although banks have the freedom to include census tracts in their assessment
areas, it is costly for a bank to omit a census tract from their assessment area if it is in
close geographic proximity to the tracts within the assessment area. (CRA §228.41 (e)(3))
Table 1.2 summarizes when an originated or purchased loan is within the assessment
area.

5
6

For web based products that facilitate selection see http://www.rataassociates.com/products_comply_features.asp
http://www.bankersonline.com/lending/guru2007/gurus_ldng032607a.html
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TABLE 1.2
When a Loan Falls within an Assessment Area
Scenario

Inside AA†

Outside

Under

AA

Certain
Conditions

A purchased or originated loan to purchase a
property located in a census tract where the bank has

√

a branch
A purchased or originated loan to purchase a

The larger

property located in a poor census tract adjacent to at

the bank, the

least one census tract where the bank has a branch

more likely

or originates at least 10% of its loans.

the loan falls
within the
banks AA

A purchased or originated loan to purchase a
property located in a census tract where the bank

√

originates at least 10% of its loans.
A purchased or originated loan to purchase a

Only if the

property located in a census tract where the bank

bank has

neither has a branch nor originates many loans.

made a case
to include the
tract in its
AA

† AA denotes assessment area.

Data collected under the provision of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA) and comments from the community are the basis for assessment. Under the
provisions of the HMDA, a bank must submit loan application registers (LAR) and CRA
disclosure records to the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
every calendar year. Bank lending data collected under the HMDA is published on the
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FFIEC website. Community groups and aggrieved borrowers are able to review a bank’s
lending history and submit comments. The CRA gives individuals and community groups
the right to take action against banks that are not adequately serving the needs of the
community. Such action usually takes the form of written complaints to the bank or
regulatory agency. These complaints sometimes result in a lower CRA rating, a delay in
the merger process or the denial of a merger application.

In this chapter and the next, we will turn our attention to one type of bank
expansion: mergers and acquisitions. Branching has not been addressed because there is
no evidence that community groups protest branch openings. Given that more than 93%
of banks have the satisfactory score necessary to open new branches and that branch
openings are seldom, if ever, protested, it is unlikely that annual originations will be
discernibly responsive to branching.

1.1.2 The Bank Merger Process

The parties to a bank merger are required to submit form S-4 to the Securities and
Exchange Commission if both or all banks involved have at least a satisfactory CRA
score. If at least one party to the merger has a Needs to Improve or a Substantial
Noncompliance score the bank will either wait until the next assessment or it will file an
appeal to the bank regulator. Applications by banks with only one subsidiary with a less
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than satisfactory score have been denied7. In the 2001 case of Wesbanco, the bank met
with community members to draft a plan of community investment. Due to these efforts,
the FDIC agreed to alter the score. (Squires,2003). The bank merger process is lengthy,
sometimes taking 6 to 9 months. Both the bank regulator and the Department of Justice
review the competitive aspects of the bank merger and the state bank regulator may
appeal the anti-trust finding. Public notice of the merger is given and the community is
invited to submit comments to request hearings. At this stage community groups are
given donations and lending pledges by banks. A 2007 National Community
Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) report states that since 1977, 466 CRA agreements have
been signed and $4.5 trillion has been pledged to LMI neighborhoods. (NCRC, 2007)
The regulator will then examine the evidence and make a decision. (Smith and Biddle,
2005) FOIA applications to the FDIC, FRB and OCC reveal that between 2001 and 2007
less than 2% of merger applications were declined or withdrawn.

1.1.3 The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and
the Truth in Lending Act

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 prohibits creditors from
discriminating on the basis of gender, race, religion, nationality, and marital status. It
also outlaws discrimination on the basis of income originating from government
subsidies8.
7
8

See the section below for a discussion of the denial of a merger by First Interstate Bancsystem.
See DOJ Civil Rights Division, Housing Section Documents Title VII § 701.
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The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act9 (HMDA) requires institutions that have at
least one branch in an MSA to submit a Loan Application Register (LAR) to the FFIEC.
The LAR is a record of the race, gender, ethnicity, income of each applicant together with
the loan amount and action taken on the application. The race and ethnicity is recorded
for each applicant that applies face-to-face for a home loan. If the applicant declines to
disclose their race or ethnicity the bank employee is required to infer the applicant’s race
from their name and to inform the applicant of the inference. The HMDA requires that
all loan application data collected be made public. Parties who protest mergers and lodge
complaints against banks at the time of CRA assessments often make use of the HMDA
data.

The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) of 1968 was written to protect consumers by
requiring that creditors disclosure all the terms and costs prior to the conclusion of loan
agreement. It should be noted that although both banks and mortgage companies are
subject to the TILA, HMDA and ECOA, mortgage companies are not as closely
monitored as banks. While banks are subject to routine audits, the FTC examines
mortgage companies in response to complaints (Laderman and Reid, 2008)

9

The requirements for reporting are available at: http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/regulationc2004.pdf
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1.2 Literature Review

Contributions to our understanding of the CRA come from both legal and
economic publications. The existing economic publications offer an array of empirical
regularities. The legal literature provides anecdotal evidence and theoretical
considerations.

The economic literature offers two broad and critical insights. First, the CRA had
some effect on home loan origination by banks. Second, mortgage companies, not
institutions subject to the CRA, originated most of the risky loans involved in the sub
prime meltdown. We can divide the economic literature into 3 broad categories. (1)
papers that link loan origination under the CRA to some measure of performance, (2)
papers that concentrate on the effect of the CRA on loan origination, (3) papers that
explore the ways that banks can avoid the provisions of the CRA.

Avery et. Al. (2005) used bank-level Call Report data and home purchase lending
data and determined that the profitability of the largest 500 retail banks is statistically
unresponsive to the amount of lending to LMI households.

A 2008 working paper by

Laderman and Reid uses data that maps California home purchase loan origination
activity to mortgage performance. They compare the performance of loans originated by
banks to loans originated by mortgage companies. After accounting for an extensive
array of borrower characteristics, type of lender and housing market control variables,
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they find that loans within a bank’s assessment area are less likely to foreclose than loans
outside the assessment area. Preliminary results indicate that mortgage companies are
responsible for originating the majority of the high-risk, poor performing loans. However,
the difference between the performance of mortgage company and bank-originated loans
is substantially diminished when only low to moderate-income neighborhoods are
examined. No account is taken of who holds the loan and how the secondary market may
lower the cost originating a risky loan.

An alternative methodology is employed by Apgar and Duda (2003) to measure
the effect of the 1995 tightening on loan origination. In this paper, origination in 1993 is
compared to origination in 2000. For these 2 years, they compare the percentages of
home loans devoted to LMI households within their assessment areas to the percentage
outside of their assessment area. They also compare the percentage of LMI home loans
originated by banks to the percentage originated by mortgage companies. They find that
the origination of loans to LMI households is greatest for banks within their assessment
areas. However, they find a decline in assessment area lending by banks. Apgar and
Duda recommend that CRA assessments look at loans made outside of the assessment
area. There is evidence that the CRA increased home ownership by minorities in New
York City in the 1990’s (Freeman and Hamilton 2002). Freeman and Hamilton estimate
a reduced-form logistic model for home-ownership for white New York City residents.
They then enter the observable characteristics of for black residents into the model and
use the difference between the predicted and observed values to estimate the proportion

19

of the difference in home ownership that is explained by observed characteristics. The
exercise is repeated for the 1991, 1993, 1996 and 1999 data. Freeman and Hamilton find
that the proportion of the difference in homeownership that is explained by observed
characteristics rose steadily from 50% in 1991 to 63.7% in 1999. The paper provides
“circumstantial evidence” that the regulatory changes in the 1990’s reduced
discrimination in home purchase lending.

Some studies indicate that the CRA has fallen short of its goals. It is held that,
due to vague performance benchmarks, some CRA scores appear inflated when compared
to more objective benchmarks (Nesiba and Golz, 2002). There is also speculation that
banks are able to circumvent the requirements of the CRA by extensive use of telephonic
and electronic applications, obscuring the race and ethnicity of applicants (Wyly and
Holloway 2002). Wyly and Holloway examine the cases where applicants declined to
give their race and ethnicity. They define the probability that there will be no racial
information for an applicant as the conditional probability that an applicant will apply
electronically and that the applicant will decline to disclose her race and ethnicity. They
estimate the probability that an applicant will obscure their race as a function of the racial
profile of the census tract from where the application came and compare the predicted
probabilities to the frequency of no racial information. Wyly and Holloway find
discrepancies between the predicted probability and actual frequency and attribute this
phenomenon to the ability of banks to obscure their true rates of denial by employing
telephonic and electronic applications.
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Banks can also find relief from the CRA by selecting the OCC as their regulator
instead of the FRB and FDIC. (Matasar and Pavelka, 1998). Data on CRA assessments
between 1990 and 1996 indicated that historically OCC was the most lenient of all
regulators. A time series comparison showed that regulators were increasingly giving a
higher proportion of outstanding scores. The comparison suggested that the difference in
the mean score given by each agency was dwindling over time. Matasar and Pavelka
interpret the relative frequency of scores over time to indicate a regime of competitive
laxity among regulatory agencies.

The legal literature can be divided into two broad, but by no means mutually
exclusive sub-categories. Studies regarding the empowerment of community groups and
their influence and research focused upon the unintended distortions to both the industrial
organization of lending and to bank portfolios. The influence that community groups
derive from the Act is relevant to our discussion to the extent that it motivates the
incentive of banks to comply with the provisions of the Act.

In practice, a CRA rating of Satisfactory or Outstanding serves to reduce the
probability of community group resistance to bank mergers and other expansions. Banks
with Satisfactory ratings have been subject to merger delays until the completion of a
scheduled examination (see First Union 1989, Cowell and Hagler 1992). Precedent
indicates that a bank’s ability to merge is only as strong as its weakest subsidiary. For
example, the Federal Reserve Board rejected the application of First Interstate
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BancSystem to acquire Commerce BancShares on CRA grounds. Despite the
Satisfactory ratings of the First Interstate subsidiaries, a subsidiary representing less than
2% of First Interstate’s assets had failed to extend credit on the North Cheyenne Indian
Reservation that fell within its assessment area.

Gramm (2002) rejects the hypothesis of benevolently motivated CRA protests in
favor of rent-seeking motivations based on his finding that the probability of a CRA
protest is increasing with respect to the asset size of the bank. Gramm estimates that the
duration of merger applications is reduced by two days if the bank is rated Outstanding
instead of Satisfactory. Gramm contends that 2 days are a long time in the merger
process because deals are sensitive to delays. However, if a bank merger can take up to 9
months, 2 days does not appear to be a meaningful delay. Macey and Miller state that
banks have learned to cope with the threat of potential community group action by
creating funds for community lending that are not pledged to any particular group,
preventing the situation where upon satisfying one group, action is then brought by
another group. Often these pledges are not fulfilled once the merger has been approved.

Much of the literature in the early 1990’s addresses the conflict between the
assumptions underlying the CRA and the changing structure of the banking industry.
While regulation permitted banks to expand across state borders, the CRA was drafted on
the assumption that banking should be local (Macey & Miller, 1993). The result was an
environment where “financial institutions walk a tightrope between the demands for
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increased CRA efforts and the need to consolidate the industry though mergers.” (Cowell
and Hagler, 1992)

Apart from potentially distorting bank consolidation, the Act encouraged risky
behavior on the part of banks. Banks are penalized with poor CRA scores for investing
too heavily in reserves and for diversifying beyond their assessment area. For example,
AmericanWest Bank of Washington was lauded in its 2004 report for a 99% loan-todeposit ratio, Woodford State Bank of Wisconsin exhibited a “reasonable” loan to deposit
ratio of 86% in the same year. Cambridge State Bank received a Substantial
Noncompliance rating for its “ultraconservative” lending practice of investing “too
heavily in government bonds.” (Macey and Miller 1993) The Act also encourages the
use of “flexible lending practices.” Flexibility in this context means low down payment
mortgages, a lowering of credit standards and a wide range of risky mortgage products.
(Liebowitz, 2008)

This paper is unique in that it uses bank level panel data that is not restricted to
any particular state or city. The results are therefore more general. This is also the first
study to use the actual assessment areas instead of an instrument, such as branch location.
Furthermore, the focus of this paper is how the CRA operates through the merger
process. New branch openings are seldom protested, and delays to mergers are costly
and community groups have a forum to complain. This study is distinct from Gramm’s
2002 study because the LAR data provide a way to observe strategic loan origination on
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the part of the bank so that they may avoid protests and delays. Data on community
lending pledges are also employed to provide a more complete picture of how the
interaction between community groups and banks influences lending.

1.3 Sample Selection and Data Summary

The CRA database is a record of the assessment dates, exam method and CRA
scores for the 17,540 banks subject CRA assessments. A random sample of 200 bank
identification numbers and regulator codes10 was taken from the CRA ratings database.
To this random sample 20 large banks were added to produce a sample that accounts for
the bulk of the deposits in the US. The annual electronic record of the many census tracts
that comprise the assessment area is available for each bank that submits a report of
agricultural and small businesses lending to the Federal Financial Institutions
Examinations Council (FFIEC)11. In order to create a sample of banks for which the
assessment areas are observable every year, the randomly selected bank identification
numbers were matched to those banks that submitted reports of CRA lending in 2002.
This matching process eliminated 35 banks from the sample. In order to remain in the
sample, the banks with observable assessment areas also had to submit their home
lending application data (their LAR’s) each year, beginning in 2001 and ending in 2006.
This left 162 banks in the sample.
10

The combination of a bank identification number (ID) and regulator number produces a unique record. For example there can be 2
banks with the ID 12345, but they will have different regulators.
11
This report is called the CRA disclosure report.
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A random sample of 50 2002 HMDA reporting institutions with “Mortgage
Company” as part of their name was selected. To remain in the sample, Lexis Nexis had
to have at least one record of a SEC filing by the mortgage company or its parent
company. The inclusion of mortgage companies in the sample increased the number of
institutions in the sample by 41. Collectively they submitted on average 6.2 million
applications per year during the window of examination. Together, the 41 mortgage
companies typically submit twice as many applications as the banks12.

Merger data for the banks were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act
from the FRB and FDIC, from the Weekly Reports at the OCC website and the merger
search engine on the OTS website. Merger data for the mortgage companies were
obtained from searching Lexis Nexis for merger related SEC filings.13 Merger protest
data was obtained from the released merger decision documents from the respective
regulators websites and from the archives of community group websites. I obtained the
dollar -value of community lending pledges from a report by the National Community
Reinvestment Coalition. Banks are under no legal obligation to honor these pledges but
pledges are potentially a powerful instrument for community group pressure. Using
observed protests to mergers as an instrument for community group pressure is
problematic because banks can potentially avoid merger protests by coming to
agreements with community groups. The ability of banks to negotiate with community
12
13

Countrywide alone accounts for approximately 2 million applications per annum.
Specifically forms DEF 14C, 40-AF-M, DEFM 14A, DEFM 14C, N-14, PRE 14A, PRE 14C, PREM 14A, PREM 14C
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groups makes pledges a superior instrument of community group pressure. Figure1.1
illustrates the sample generation process. Coalition. The use of pledges or dummy
variables indicating whether or not the bank has made a pledge, as an independent
variable is potentially problematic. Banks that are pressured into making pledges may
have higher rates of denial for LMI and minority applicants. Therefore the direction of
causation between denial rates and pledges is uncertain.

The 162 banks in the sample merged 250 times between 2001 and 2006. 51 of
these mergers were protested. Merging institutions are overrepresented in the sample,
2,051 mergers were recorded for the universe of 12,700 banks in the country between
2001 and 2006. This is due to the inclusion of 20 large banks in the sample. The 41
mortgage companies merged 14 times over the sample period. The banks in the sample
pledged $3.2 trillion14 of CRA lending to community groups. All banks between 1977
and 2007 pledged $4.5 trillion of CRA lending. Banks are

14

Total home lending by the banks in the sample over the sample period was $1,727 trillion, 53% of total pledges.
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Figure 1.1: Sample Generation
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Three hundred and eighty-two CRA assessments were conducted for sampled
banks between 2001 and 2006. Those assessments awarded 107 scores of Outstanding ,
271 Satisfactory and 1 Needs to Improve. The average rating was 1.72 over the sample
period. A comparison of the CRA data for the sample and the population is summarized
in Table 1.3 below.
TABLE 1.3
Comparison of Sample and Population CRA Data 2001-2006
Variable

Population

Sample

Number of Banks

9,377

162

Number of Assessments

13,334

382

Average Score

1.89

1.72

Percentage Outstanding Scores

11%

28%

Percentage Satisfactory Scores

86%

71.2%

Percentage Needs to Improve Scores

3%

0.002%

Percentage Substantial Noncompliance Scores

0.009%

0%

Percentage Large Bank Assessments

23%

89%

Percentage Intermediate Bank Assessments

4%

4%

Percentage Small Bank Assessments†

70%

6%

Mean Asset Size ($ 000’s)

1,492,343

12,958,093

† The remainder of the assessments were wholesale and special purpose bank types of assessment.

Table 1.3 reveals the extent to which large banks have been oversampled. This is
appropriate for this study because large banks are more likely to be under community
group pressure and this paper is concerned with the role of communities groups in bank
mergers.
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Table A1 of Appendix A shows the summary statistics for banks and Table A2
shows the summary statistics for mortgage companies. On average banks purchase15
20% of the new loans on their balance sheet and deny 20% of their applications. They
deny 30% of the applications within their assessment area16. The denial rate for black
applicants is approximately 22% both within and outside of the assessment area. The
average bank in the sample gets 12,229 applications from whites every year and denies
10% of these both within and outside of its assessment area. Figure 1.2 shows denials as
a percentage of applications by race.

FIGURE 1.2
Total, Assessment Area and Non-Assessment Area Denial Rates by Race

Note: AA denotes assessment are

15
16

Purchased loans are loans originated by other institutions
Rate of denial is a fraction of (originations+purchases) minus purchases.
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Banks originate only 52% of the applications they receive from LMI households.
Loans to LMI applicants are only available for 2005 and 2006, this is when the HMDA
data began to record median census tract income. 51% of the applications banks receive
are for refinance loans.

Table A2 of Appendix A contains the summary statistics for mortgage companies.
The average mortgage company in the sample receives 5 times as many applications as
the average bank. 22% of new loans on the average mortgage company’s balance sheet
are purchased. The denial rate of loans to white applicants is about 16% and the denial
rate on black applications is about 22%. 55% of the loans mortgage companies originate
are refinance loans.

The variables used in the panel estimation are tabulated and defined

below in Table 1.4. Applications by LMI households are only observed in 2005 and
2006. Panel estimation is therefore impractical for the origination of loans to LMI
households. In the case of applications by LMI households, the change in the rate of
origination between 2005 and 2006 is the dependent variable so that bank specific effects
are differenced out.
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TABLE 1.4
List of Variables and Definitions
Variable Name

Definition
Explanatory Variables

Merger

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution merges or acquires another institution
in the current year.

Merger Protest

A dummy variable equal to 1 if any entity lodged an objection to a merger with the
bank’s regulator.

Pledge

A dummy variable to 1 during the current year if the institution pledged to a
community group to expand CRA lending.

Ever Pledge

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution made any pledge to a community
group since 1977.

Ever

The interaction between these two variables is intended to control for merging banks

Pledge*Merger

under community group pressure.

(T+1)
CRA Exam

A dummy variable equal to 1 if the institution was subject to a CRA Exam during
the current year.

CRA Rating

The CRA rating of the institution as of its last CRA exam.
Dependent Variables

Denial Rate

The number of applications by members of a particular racial group that denied as a
fraction of the total applications by members of the racial group.

Change in LMI

The difference between the percentage of loans to LMI applicants originated in 2006

Originations as a

and the percentage of loans to LMI applicants (applicants with less than 80% of the

Percentage of LMI

median MSA income) originated in 2005.

Applications
Origination of

The number of refinance loans either originated or purchased from other institutions

Refinance Loans

as a fraction of total applications for refinance loans.

as a Percentage of
Applications for
Refinance Loans
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1.4 Econometric Model

A fixed-effects panel model is used to estimate the influence of CRA control
variables and mergers on lending. The panel is unbalanced and short, having only 6
years and 142 institutions.

The fixed effects model to be estimated is generally written as:

y it = Χ'it β + α i + εit

(1)

Where α i denotes the fixed effect, or conditional mean for the “group”. In this

€

case the i subscript denotes the identification number of the banks. Institutions will most
€ differ in the extent to which they originate home loans as opposed to small
certainly

business and agricultural loans. They will also differ with respect to their propensity for
risk according to the form of ownership. The individual fixed-effects coefficients will
capture institution specific effects and therefore eliminate one source of omitted variable
bias. The vector product Χ'it β for this paper denotes a set of CRA control variables and
their coefficients. Specifically,

€
Χ'it β = β1 + β 2 (everpledge * merger(t + 1)) it + β 3 (everpledge) + β 4 (merger(t))
(2)
+β 5 (merger(t + 1)) it + β 6 (Merger Pr otest) it + β 7 (CRAExam) it + β 8 (CRARating) it

€

The estimates of the coefficients will allow us to perform the following inferences:
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TABLE 1.5
Inference Tests and Interpretation
Coefficients

Firms that merge in the next period should change some of their lending

^

β2 ≥ 0
^

patterns more if they are under community group pressure

^

β2 ≥ β3
€

^

β6 ≠ 0
€

Interpretation

The effect of community group pressure on lending should be more
intense when firms are planning to merge
Banks higher denial and lower origination rates should invite CRA
protests. When the dependent variable is the rate of denial, the
occurrence of a protest predicts a higher rate of denial. When the
dependent variable is the rate of origination, the occurrence of a protest

€

predicts a lower rate of origination.
^

β7 ≥ 0

Banks undergoing a CRA assessment during the current year should
change their lending patterns by more than banks that are not being
assessed.

^

€

€

β8 ≥ 0

Banks with lower numeric (i.e. better) scores should have on average
fewer denials and more originations in the lending categories examined.

The fixed effects panel model is estimated using the method of OLS. Year fixedeffects are also tested for significance.

1.5 Empirical Investigation: Mergers and the CRA

A CRA score of at least satisfactory is needed only when a bank wants to expand.
This paper selects mergers to identify the effect of the CRA on lending because most
banks already have the at least the satisfactory rating needed to expand and therefore the
enforcement mechanism of the CRA is through protests and complaints. New branching
33

applications are rarely protested and therefore banks are much more likely to strategically
change lending patterns around the time of a merger. Earning at least a satisfactory score
gives banks the option to expand in the future and therefore a dummy variable indicating
whether or not the bank was subject to a CRA exam is included. The other explanatory
variables are dummies for whether a merge was protested and whether the bank made a
pledge to community groups to increase their lending to disadvantaged groups.

I use 3 margins of comparison to test the effects of mergers on lending. First I use
the occurrence of mergers in the current year as a treatment effect and compare merging
banks vs. non-merging banks. This comparison identifies changes in lending due to the
CRA. It is in fact testing a joint hypothesis: the effect of merging on lending and the
effect of the CRA on lending. Banks may change their lending patterns in response to a
merger because the behavior of outgoing managers changes in anticipation of a merger.

In order to determine to what extent the change in lending may be
attributed to the CRA, I use whether the institution is subject to the CRA as a treatment
and compare merging banks to merging mortgage companies. I then compare the lending
of merging banks within the assessment area to their lending of merging banks outside of
the assessment area. This is a test of whether the CRA leads to targeted changes in
lending or to an overall decline in lending standards (Liebowitz, 2008). The set of tests
are summarized in Table 1.6.
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TABLE 1.6
Empirical Test Overview
Comparison

Hypothesis

Interpretation

Lending of Merging Banks

Coefficients on the dummy

The CRA influences the kinds of

vs.

variable MERGE are

lending undertaken by merging

Non-Merging Banks

significantly different from zero

banks.

Lending of Merging Banks

The lending of mortgage

The changes in lending around

vs.

companies is invariant to merger

the time of a merger are due to

Lending of Merging Mortgage

plans while the lending of banks

the CRA and not to agency costs

Companies

is altered

Lending of Merging banks

The lending of merging banks

The CRA leads to a general

within the Assessment Area vs.

should change both within and

change in standards not to

Lending of Banks Outside of the

outside of the assessment area

targeted changes.

Assessment Area

The next question is to what kinds of lending do we turn our attention to in order
to gauge the effects of the CRA? The three key dimensions are: race, income and
riskiness. Many protests of bank mergers are lodged on the basis of racial discrimination.
Therefore I compare total denials as a fraction of total applications for black applicants,
white applicants and applicants that do not disclose their race. At this juncture it is
important to address the Wyly and Holloway (2002) result. If banks deflate the rate of
denial to black applicants by using telephonic applications we can test the robustness of
these results by regressing of the proportion of applicants who do not disclose their race
as a function of whether or not the institution plans to merge. The CRA is written to
encourage lending to LMI households, therefore the denial rate of loans to LMI
households is also of interest.
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The data can also contribute to our understanding of how and to what extent the
CRA influenced “risky” lending. The data set does not show what proportion of loans
went into default, but from previous research (Gramlich, 2007) we know that refinance
loans carry high default risk. For banks and mortgage companies separately I regress a
panel of each denial rate on an expansion dummy that is equal to 1 if the institutions is
planning to merge. For banks the denial rate is also regressed on a set of CRA variables.
The CRA variables are listed in Table 1.4. To see the influence of the CRA on risky
lending I regress the percentage of originated refinance loans as a fraction of application
for refinance loans in merger and CRA variables.

1.6 Results

The results are displayed in Appendix B. Year fixed-effects were rejected for all
panel regressions. By comparing the results presented for banks in Tables B1 through B3
to the results for mortgage companies presented in the first columns (a), (b) and (c) of
Table B6 we can see that denial rates for black applicants, white applicants and
applicants who do not disclose their race behave similarly in the presence of merger
activity for both banks and mortgage companies. However, the interaction between an
upcoming merger and the instrument for community group pressure results in a reduction
in denials to black applicants. Table B1 column (c) shows that this result is particularly
pronounced for black applicants within the assessment area. Unless banks have the
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power to select their assessment area to minimize denials to black applicants, a
comparison between the rates of denial between black applicants inside and outside the
assessment area as shown in columns (c) and (d) of Table B1 suggests that the effects of
the CRA are limited to the assessment area and do not lead to an overall change in
lending standards. A merging bank under CRA pressure will decrease its denial rate of
black applicants by 10.4% in the year before the merger is granted. A merging bank
under CRA pressure will decrease its denial rate of black applicants by 2.3% in the year
before the merger is granted. The results from the CRA control variables are presented
in Table 1.7. It is problematic that the dummy variable Ever Pledge has an effect in the
panel regressions. Around 76% of the banks in the sample made a pledge before the
sample period began and the fact that the dummy alone explains some variation not
captured by the bank fixed effect suggests that there is some time dependence in the Ever
Pledge dummy variable. In Tables B1 and B2 the effects were more significant and
larger in the pooled regressions for black and white denial rates respectively. These
higher and more significant coefficients for the pooled regressions are consistent with the
hypothesis that some banks have higher average rates of denial than others. In the panel
regressions the bank fixed effect absorbs some of the power of the marginal effect of
Ever Pledge.
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TABLE 1.7
Inference Tests and Interpretation17
Tests

Meaning

^

β2 ≥ 0

Denial –

Denial -

Denials –

Originatio

Originations

Black

White

“No

ns –LMI

-Refinance

Race”

Loans

Table B1

Table B2

Table B3

Table B4

Table B5

√

√

X

√

√

√

√

X

√

√

√

√

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Effect of Merger
stronger under
community group
pressure

€

^

^

β2 ≥ β3

Community
group pressure
operates through
mergers

€

^

β6 ≠ 0

Protests explain
higher rates of
denial and lower
origination

€
^

β7 ≥ 0

Banks change
their lending in
anticipation of a
CRA assessment

€

^

β8 ≥ 0

Protests explain
higher rates of
denial and lower
origination

€

17

These results are for lending within the assessment area.
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While the interaction between community group pressure and a merger in the next
period leads to a reduction in the rate of denial of black applicants, and to limited extent,
white applicants within the assessment area, Table B3 shows that this effect is not present
for applicants who choose not to disclose their race. This pattern of results could be due
to the credit worthiness kind of applicants who apply telephonically and no not disclose
their race. The percentage of loans to applicants who do not disclose their race as a
fraction of total applications was regressed on the same CRA and merger variables used
in Tables B1 through B3. A possible interpretation of the negative coefficients on Ever
Pledge for the denial rates of applicants who do not declare their race presented in
columns (b) and (c) of Table B3 is that banks under community group pressure use
electronic applications to avoid community group scrutiny. A regression of the number of
loan application on parties that do not disclose their race on CRA and merger
independent variables showed no evidence to suggest that banks were strategically
utilizing channels that allow applicants to conceal their race and ethnicity. TableB4
shows that the origination of loans to LMI applicants is responsive to the interaction
between community group pressure and a future merger. Column (b) of Table B4
indicates that this effect is pronounced within the assessment area. Bank under
community group pressure will increase their origination of CRA loans by 4.3% when
they are planning to burn.

An examination of the coefficients of the Ever Pledge dummy in Tables A1
through A3 offers a surprising result. Banks who respond to community group pressure

39

by making pledges have higher rates of denial to black applicants, white applicants and to
applicants who do not disclose their race. This finding could be due to the fact that
community groups exert more pressure on banks with higher rates of denial.
Nevertheless, when interpreted in conjunction with the positive effect of the interaction
between Ever Pledge and future mergers, it suggests an interesting strategy by
pressurized banks. That is: only respond to community group pressure when you are
planning to merge. Table A5 shows that banks that both face community group pressure
and are merging in the next year originate more refinance loans within their assessment
areas and fewer refinance loans outside their assessment area. By comparing the
coefficients on Ever Pledge and whether or not the bank made a pledge in the current
year in Table B6 reveals that the origination of refinance loans is more responsive to
current pledges than to past ones. This suggests that banks fulfill their current pledges by
temporarily increasing their originations of refinance loans. The results in terms of the
empirical strategy outlined in Table 1.5 are summarized in Table 1.8.
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TABLE 1.8
Summary of Empirical Test Results
Comparison

Hypothesis

Results

Lending of Merging

Coefficients on the dummy

Merging is only important if the bank is

Banks

variable MERGE are

under community group pressure

vs.

significantly different from

Non-Merging

zero

Banks
Lending of Merging

The lending of mortgage

Column (d) of Table B6 indicates that

Banks

companies is invariant to

merging mortgage companies originate

vs.

merger plans while the

7.7% more refinance loans in the year

Lending of Merging

lending of banks is altered

before they merge. Merging banks do

Mortgage

not. Exhibit a similar pattern unless they

Companies

are under community group pressure.
Merging mortgage companies do not
change the racial pattern of their
originations, but merging banks do.
(Tables B1-B3)

Lending of Merging

The lending of merging banks

Lending within the assessment area is

banks within the

should change both within and

much more sensitive to mergers under

Assessment Area vs.

outside of the assessment area

CRA pressure than lending outside the

Lending of Banks

if the CRA leads to an overall

assessment area. Unless banks can vary

Outside of the

change in lending standards.

their assessment areas freely every year,

Assessment Area

this indicates targeted changes as opposed
to an overall change in lending standards.
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I calculate the change in the total value of loans originated due to the interaction
between banks and community groups at the time of a merger by using the average loan
amount for white applicants, black applicants, applicants who do not disclose their race
and refinance loans. By using Ever Pledge as an indicator of community group pressure,
the NCRC report indicates that there are 350 banks under community group pressure. If
we assume that each of the 350 banks merged only once during the 6 year period, the
interaction between the merger process and community groups resulted in the origination
of at least an additional $15.7 bn. worth of loans to black applicants, $40.3 bn. worth of
loan to white applicants and $85 bn. of refinance loans. If we assume that each of the
350 banks merged 6 times in 6 years, the maximum estimate is an additional $94.3 bn.
worth of loans to black applicants, $242 bn. worth of loans to white applicants and $647
bn. of refinance loans. The banks under community group pressure in the sample merged
an average of 3.2 times each between 2001 and 2006.

1.7 Concluding Remarks

The CRA influences bank lending by jointly constraining the merger process and
giving community groups the right to protest. With the exception of refinance loans,
neither the merger process nor pledges to community groups alone can change patterns in
origination. The effect is largely limited to lending within the assessment area. This may
be because the assessment area itself is endogenous and chosen by banks to maximize
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their performance under the CRA. However, the fact that changes in lending patterns are
confined to the assessment area strengthens the result that changes in lending are due the
CRA and that banks respond to CRA pressure not by lowering lending standards in
general but by strategic lending. The differential effect within and outside of the
assessment area strengthen the case that changes in lending patterns are due to the CRA.
The changes in lending by banks in anticipation of a merger are not explained by other
merger related factors, otherwise we would see similar effects both for banks planning to
merge that are not under pressure from community groups and for merging mortgage
companies. All of these differentials constitute persuasive circumstantial evidence that
the CRA lead to changes in lending standards.

The effects of the CRA do not appear to be negligible. The banks under
community group pressure are typically very large institutions that are required to
originate many more qualifying loans to satisfy the requirements of the CRA. If these
banks merged 6 times in 6 year, the CRA could for account as many as $983.3bn
additional loans in the system. The lower bound of $141bn of CRA related loans is still
economically significant.

Banks get credit for originating and purchasing loans, but not for holding them.
There still remains the question of what the banks do with the CRA loan they originate.
Chapter Two explores the propensity to securitize CRA loans and Chapter Three looks at
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the appetite of public and private firms on the secondary market to purchase risky
mortgages.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND SECURITIZATION
OF ASSETS BY COMMERCIAL BANKS
Introduction
The fact that banks are given CRA credit for purchasing or originating community
loans, but not for holding them has the potential to create perverse incentives. If banks
are not holding loans to maturity, they may lower standards in ways that may be unclear
to buyers of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). This paper relates the timing of CRA
exams to the bank’s securitization activities. I find that the presence of a CRA
examination does not significantly alter the propensity of a bank to securitize unless the
bank is planning a merger.

I also find that the secondary market absorbs $260 in securitized assets for every
$1,000 worth of assets acquired during the merger if the institution faces a CRA
examination in the quarter before the merger. There is strong circumstantial evidence to
suggest that this change is due to the CRA exam. Commercial banks that do not face a
CRA exam in the quarter before a merger actually reduce the amount they securitize in
the current quarter.
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2.1 The Community Reinvestment Act and Mergers

The Act was passed in 1977. The intention of the Act was to encourage lending
institutions to serve their communities. Banks had to undergo assessments and were
assigned ratings18 based upon to extent to which they met the needs of their assessment
area. A rating of at least satisfactory was required if the bank’s application for a new
deposit facility was to be approved by the regulators. A new deposit facility refers to any
new branch, merger or acquisition. The Act therefore limits the ability of a lending
institution to expand. All depository institutions are subject to the provisions of the Act,
including wholesale and business banks.

Many revisions were made to the Act during its brief history. In 1989, CRA
ratings and reports were required to be public. In 1995, the standards of compliance were
tightened. Banks were assessed on the basis of explicit proportions of lending within the
assessment area to lending outside. The assessment consists of three components: the
lending test, the service test and the investment test.

These tests assess the extent to which the bank is lending, providing services for
and investing in its community. The proportion of loans by value and volume to small
businesses, small farms and moderate to low-income households came under scrutiny.
The values of these proportions are reported, however there are no transparent

18

The four possible ratings are: Outstanding, Satisfactory, Needs to Improve and Substantial Non-Compliance.
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benchmarks. What is clear is the importance of the lending test. A bank with an
outstanding lending test can never receive an overall rating that is less than satisfactory,
regardless of how poorly it may score on the other tests.

In 1999, in response to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act19, the CRA was expanded to
require banks to be CRA compliant if they desired to engage in investment banking and
insurance. In 2005, less strict requirements were placed on small and intermediate
banks20.

The CRA conferred the right upon community groups to take action against banks
that were not adequately serving the needs of the community.

2.2 Literature Review

Asset securitization is best defined as the “partial or complete segregation of a
specific set of cash flows from a corporation’s other assets and the issuance of securities
based on these cash flows.” (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005) Between 1986 and 2006, the
initial apprehension present in asset securitization literature gave way to enthusiasm.

19
20

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act19 allowed the same institution to engage in banking, investment banking and insurance provisions
Initially, a small bank was defined as a bank with fewer than $1 billion worth of assets.
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2.2.1 Judgment Proofing

Initially, there was a great deal of debate surrounding the potential for
corporations to ”judgment proof” their assets through securitization. (LoPucki, 1996)
The “judgment proofing school” held that corporations could separate the ownership and
the operation of assets through securitization. When tort liability arose in the normal
course of business, claims would be limited to the meager assets of the operating firm.

Detractors of judgment proofing contended that the assets of a firm that engaged
in securitization would not be diminished. The firm would receive consideration equal to
the present value of the future benefits generated by the asset and, unless the
consideration was paid out to the shareholders, the ability of the firm to meet the claims
of creditors would be unchanged. (Schwarcz, 1999) The growing propensity of firms to
securitize assets that do not generate tort liabilities21 diverted intellectual energy from
judgment proofing to efficiency gains.

2.2.2 Tailoring Risk Exposure to Preference

Asset securitization is held to facilitate a better match of risk bearing with risk
preference (Berger&Benveniste, 1994). In the event of liquidation of the originating
firm, investors in securitized assets are protected because they have preferential claim to

21

For instance, debt obligations.

48

specific assets. In this respect asset securitization is similar to secured debt. As the
“partition22” between the assets and firms is stronger in the case of asset securitization, it
is arguably superior to secured debt. Mortgage backed securities (MBS) advance the
matching of security to both risk preference and investor specific information. Investors
in MBS are able to choose between general claims, interest only or principal only
obligations.

2.2.3 Hidden-Information

The phenomenon of asset securitization is highly amenable to theories that
assume asymmetric information. The literature that analyzes the incentives to securitize
that derive from asymmetric information falls into two categories: theories of hiddeninformation and theories of hidden-action. (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005)

Hidden-information theories differ in terms of whether there is an asymmetry of
information on the non-securitized assets or the securitized assets of the firm. They are
similar in the respect that they rely upon “market forces to allocate claims to those
investors who are best informed about returns.”

In the case of the asymmetric information about non-securitized assets,
securitization is the means by which the securities market circumvents the lemons market
22

The partition in this context is a legal one. Securitization approximates a “true sale” of assets to a greater extent than the issuing of
secured debt. It is therefore less likely that the preferential claim of the investor in securitized assets will be compromised.
(Iacobucci&Winter 2005)
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premium on claims to the pooled assets of the firm. An asymmetry of information
between inside and outside investors is assumed to exist. The managers of high-quality
firms securitize the assets about which investors are equally informed in order to signal
the quality of the remaining assets. This leads to securitization on the part of managers of
lower quality firms, as the decision to not securitize would signal low quality assets.
(Myers&Majluf, 1984)

The latter hidden-information explanation assumes an asymmetry of information
between different types of investors about the securitized assets of the firm. The
investors who specialize in information regarding one kind of asset are the investors most
willing to accept a higher level of risk regarding the asset. The firm securitizes this type
of asset. When specialized investors purchase subordinated tranches of these assets, they
provide a quality assurance to other investors. (Schwarcz, 2002) In this case, firms will
not use the services of ratings firms. (Schwarcz, 1994)

The hidden-information problem can also be overcome through the combination
of securitization and the services of ratings firms. (Iocabucci & Winter, 2005) In this
case, firms with high-quality securitizable assets will signal that quality by paying the
high transactions costs associated with ratings assessments.
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2.2.4 Hidden-Action

This literature utilizes the variation in the sensitivity of different cash flows to
managerial effort. The literature predicts that the likelihood of securitization is
proportional to the invariance of the cash flow to managerial effort. A tenuous23
distinction is drawn between the ability of management to influence the value of cash
flows and the ability of management to influence the collection of cash flows. It is
assumed that while the former is insensitive to managerial effort, the latter is susceptible
to managerial shirking.

Agency costs may be reduced by asset securitization. This method of reducing
agency costs may in fact be superior to requiring that managers be residual claimants.
Asset securitization is a way to avoid risk aversion on the part of management when
required to hold a substantial form of their wealth in the form of residual claims.
(Iacobucci&Winter, 2005)

Monitoring of managerial effort is enhanced when cash flows, which are
insensitive to managerial effort, are separated from those that are not. In an application
of Holoström’s model of the effect of managerial reputation on action and effort, the
decision to securitize assets signals managerial commitment to great effort.

23

The distinction is tenuous because anecdotal evidence suggests that there exists some set of skills, apart from the absence of
shirking, which are suited to collection. Therefore, even in the absence of shirking, the value of future cash flows may be different
depending on the talent of the manager in charge of collection. (www.calculatedrisk.blogspot.com)
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Through securitization, firms may also be able to reduce the probability of a takeover. Firms that are poorly managed are more likely to be acquired than firms with poor
assets. Managers have a reduced incentive to expend effort in order to avoid a take-over
when there is a chance that the market will mistake poor asset quality for poor
management. In order to increase managerial effort, if is therefore in the firm’s interests
to securitize all assets that are insensitive to managerial effort. (Iacobucci&Winter, 2005)

2.3 Regulatory motives for Securitization by Banks

Securitization by banks in particular has an added complication when the contract
includes recourse provisions. A recourse provision is an agreement by the bank to absorb
some of the risk of the assets. Such provisions include agreements to pay shortfalls in
interest (STRIPS) and principal, an agreement to buy the asset back from the investor in
the event of default, (SLCs24) or the retention of the riskiest tranche25 of the securitized
assets. Berger and Benveniste (1992) perceive the SLC as an uninsured demand deposit.
Their paper argues that securitization with SLC credit enhancement improves efficiency26
by allowing banks to circumvent the prohibition of issuing senior debt

If in fact SLCs create uninsured demand deposits, the ramifications for bank risk
should be considered. In the absence of deposit insurance, demand deposits contracts
24

Secured Letters of Credit (SLC’s)
The most junior claim to the proceeds of pool of securitized assets.
26
. The regulation against senior debt reduces efficiency by restricting the kind of contracts banks can write.
25
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lead to multiple equilibria, which include a bank run equilibrium. (Dvbvig&Diamond,
1983) Just as the expectation that the bank will not be able to satisfy all demand deposits
tomorrow leads to a bank run today; so too can the simultaneous fall in value of
securitized assets lead to the synchronous exercising of multiple SLCs.

Regulatory arbitrage is purported to be a motivation for asset securitization by
banks. Regulatory arbitrage refers to the reallocation of assets that occurs when a firm’s
true risk deviates from the level of risk consistent with the constraints imposed by
regulation. If a bank’s reserves are in excess of what is required to meet claims by
depositors and to cover for loan defaults, the bank will securitize its less risky assets until
the riskiness of the loan portfolio held is commensurate with reserve requirements.
(Greenspan, 1998) Chapter Three deals more explicitly with regulatory arbitrage.

2.4 A Model of the Incentives to Securitize and Offer Credit Enhancements under
the CRA and when the Institutions Desires to Merge

Assumption 1: there are 2 regimes, a CRA and a non-CRA regime, where community
loans do and do not contribute toward a bank’s ability to expand respectively.
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Regime 1: Bank Expansion and CRA Compliance are unrelated
Assumption 2: there are only 2 kinds of assets to be securitized, High Quality and Low
Quality.

Let,

€

i

denote the yield received by buyer

p

denote the actual rate of return on high quality asset to seller

Χ

denote the face value of the pool of assets securitized

CE denote credit enhancements offered by the seller

€

€
€
€

h

denote high quality assets

l

denote low quality assets

q

index the quality of the asset, q ∈ {h,l}

€
€

€
Assumption 3: q is known to the seller, but not to the buyer
Return to the buyer: Π B = (1+ iq )X + CE
€

(1a)

Return to seller: Π S = (1+ pq ) Χ − CE − (1+ iq ) Χ
€
For “High Quality” Assets
€
If Π s ≥ 0, then ⇒ ( ph − i) ≥

€

€
For “Low
Quality” Assets
€

If Π s ≥ 0, then ⇒ ( pl − i) ≥

€

CE
(2)
X

€

€

CE
(3)
X
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(1b)

In Regime 1, buyers can require CE * to ensure that only “High Quality” assets are sold.
Regime 2: CRA Compliance related Bank Expansion
€
Assumption 4: A bank’s ability to expand is proportional the number of community loans
originated and purchased, but not held.
Assumption 5: The more community loans a bank originates or purchases, the more
community loans it will securitize.
Assumption 6: All “Low Quality” loans are community loans.
Assumption 7: Only firms that securitize “High Quality” loans are able to expand.
Assumption 8: Expanding firms will securitize both “High Quality” and “Low Quality”
loans.
Let,

β e = The present value of the future benefits of a future business expansion
θ = The proportion of loans that are “Low Quality”

€
€
€

€

φ =

The probability of a satisfactory CRA rating

T =

The sum of the face values of “High Quality” and “Low Quality” assets
securitized

if ,

φ (θ ) and φ '> 0 (4)

€

and if,
€

θ=

€

Xl
(5a)
Xl + Xh

€

and

(1− θ ) =

Xh
(5b)
Xl + Xh
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then,

CE  
CE 
e
Profit to the seller = π s,CRA = (1− θ ) ph − i −
 + θ pl − i −
 + φ (θ )β
Xh  
Xl 


(6a)

The maximum CE the seller is willing to offer satisfies the following condition:
€


(1− θ ) ph − i −


€

CE  
CE 
e
 + θ pl − i −
 + φ (θ )β = 0
Xh  
Xl 

and is given by,

β e  X + X l 
CE =  ph − θ ( ph − pl ) − i + φ (θ )  h

X T  2 


€

βe
XT

(7a)

and,
 βe 
∂i
= −( ph − pl ) +  φ '
∂θ
 XT 

€

(6c)

Setting CE = 0 and solving for i , we arrive with

€ CE = 0 ⇒ i = ph − θ ( p€h − pl ) + φ (θ )

€

(6b)

(7b)

The seller generates a higher return by selling “Low Quality” loans because of the
benefit it receives in the form of more probable future expansion.
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The buyer will not raise CE above CE * because the raise would not alter the
proportion of “Low Quality” loans in the bundle.
€

Let,

€

λ denote the probability that the buyer will receive r from the bundle

CE *
The expected Profit to the buyer: Ε(π B,CRA ) = λ(θ ) r +
Xl

(8)

The use of credit€enhancements will “exclude” the banks that securitize only
“Low Quality” loans, but will not prevent banks that securitize “High Quality” loans
from securitizing “Low Quality” ones as well.

Predictions from the Model:

I

Banks should securitize more when if they plan to expand in the future

II

The credit enhancements that banks offer will not increase before expansion

2.5 The Empirical Test

To test the model given above we examine a panel of banks that securitized loans
from the second quarter of 2004 until the first quarter of 2006. Fixed effects panel data
models are estimated for the following dependent variables:
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•

value of pools securitized

•

credit enhancements on securitized pools

•

the ratio of the credit enhancements to the pools securitized

A panel data model is convenient because the median and distribution of income for
the bank’s assessment area is difficult to measure. Firm fixed effects will capture the
unobserved firm specific heterogeneity. Time fixed effects will capture the heterogeneity
in the propensity of buyers to purchase loans27. Random effects models offered no
improvement over the fixed effects models, suggesting very little change in character of
the assessment areas over the window of time sampled.

Under examination are:

•

the marginal effects of having a CRA exam

•

the marginal effects of having a CRA exam when you plan to expand in the future

With that in mind, after controlling for the value of bank deposits, the effects of
an assessment in the previous, current and next quarter on the dependent variables are
estimated. The value of an upcoming merger or acquisition and the interaction between

27

In particular, there was a change in the policy of Fannie Mae to buy subprime loans late in 2005.
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current assessment and the value of an upcoming merger or acquisition is included
amongst the independent variables. The results are presented in the Table 2.1.

Some important omitted variables are measurements of community group
pressure and expansion through the establishment of new branches. Community group
pressure is omitted because level call report disclosure is made for banks on a more
disaggregated level of the corporate structure than pledges to community groups, which
are usually undertaken by the parent companies. The parent companies of the banks
filing the call report are often no observable. Branching is not included as a measure of
expansion because community groups do not appear to protest the opening of new
branches. There are many instances of community group protests for mergers and
acquisitions, and it is to these margins of expansion that we direct our attention.
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TABLE 2.1
Results of Panel Regression of Securitized Assets and Credit Enhancements on Bank and
CRA-Related Variables
(1)
Securitized Assets (SEC)

(2)
Credit Enhancements (CE)

(3)
Ratio of CE
and SEC

Deposits

0.156**

0.005***

0.000

(0.002)

(0.0004)

(0.000)

-10603

-2103.15

0.0113

(56707)

(8561.68)

(0.012)

-39217.53

-2524.6

-0.0028

(56439.83)

(8521.33)

(0.012)

-22792.63

-3978.9

0.0028

(57128.12)

(8640.42)

(0.013)

Future

-0.293612***

-0.0172***

-0.000

Expansion

(0.01158)

(0.0018)

(0.000)

Future

0.2867**

0.0322*

-0.000

Expansion

(0.1245)

(0.0187)

(0.000)

Exam (t-1)
Exam (t)
Exam (t+1)

*Exam (t)
ARM (t-1)

-0.007***
(0.0019)

Constant

€

-7919.25

33977.46***

0.380***

(18144)

(2601.8)

(0.005)

R 2 within

0.5163

0.0557

0.0002

R 2 between

0.7511

0.3601

0.0011

R 2 overall

0.7400

0.3369

0.0001

Pr>F(Indep.)

0.0000

0.0000

0.9854

€

Pr>F(groups)

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

€

σu

3183177.4

379434.9

0.432

σe
ρ

893947.63

134940.25

0.196

0.9268

0.888

0.829

€

Number obs.

5344

5338

5344

€
€

Number Groups

669

669

669

*** - significant at the 1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level
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Table 2.2 contains the results of a similar panel regression that measures the
change in securitized assets as a proportion of total deposits. Total deposits were used
instead of total assets to give an indication of the proportion of securitized assets to bank
size while avoiding the problems caused by the negative relationship between off balance
sheet and on balance sheet assets. Although the coefficients do not explain a great deal
of variation in the proportion of securitized assets and credit enhancements, we see the
same pattern in the effects of exams and mergers on their own and when interacted.

TABLE 2.2
Results of Panel Regression of Securitized Assets and Credit Enhancements as a Fraction of
Deposits on Bank and CRA-Related Variables
(1)

(2)

Securitized Assets (SEC) as a

Credit Enhancements (CE)

Fraction of Deposits

As a Fraction of Deposits

-0.0061***

-0.00117

(0.0022)

(0.0008)

-0.0083***

-0.00365

(0.00313)

(0.00173)

-0.0071***

-0.00044

(0.00254)

(0.0009)

Future

-0.0004 **

0.000013***

Expansion

(0.0004)

(0.0000079)

Future

0.00056***

0.000717***

Expansion

(0.000028)

(0.00000812)

Exam (t-1)
Exam (t)
Exam (t+1)

*Exam (t)
Number obs.

5344

5338

Number Groups

669

669

*** - significant at the 1% level, ** - significant at the 5% level
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2.6 Interpretation of Results

The occurrence of a CRA assessment has no significant effect on any of the
dependent variables. This result is inconsistent with the impression that banks compete
for high CRA assessments in order to generate goodwill. However, if a firm is planning
to expand in the future and is undergoing an exam in the current quarter, an increment of
$1,000 in the value of future expansion predicts an increase of $286.70 in the amount of
securitization.

The same increase of $1,000 in the value of future expansion predicts an increase
in credit enhancements of only $32. The difference in the magnitude of these effects
seems to be consistent with the predictions of the model: the requirement of a least a
“satisfactory” CRA rating increases the total amount of securitization, but not the credit
enhancements. The lack of proportionality of credit enhancements offered for securitizing
riskier loans constitutes evidence that banks do not incur the full costs of originating risky
loans. This result will strengthen the incentive to originate loans for CRA compliance.
This is also consistent with the results presented in column (c) of the Table 2.1. None of
the explanatory variables, particularly the interaction between future expansion and
current assessment, explains any of the variation in the ratio of credit enhancements to
securitized assets.
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2.7 Concluding Remarks

The data shows that the Act is applied as it is written: CRA compliance is
important when a bank is planning an expansion. The results reveal that banks do not
retain all of the loans they originate in order to comply with the CRA. The primary
lender does not have to offer more credit enhancements as a proportion of securitized
assets in order to induce investors to accept the newly securitized assets. This means that
investors may not be fully cognizant of the riskiness of the loans they are purchasing.
More importantly it indicates that banks may not have to incur the full cost of originating
loans for CRA purposes. If these riskier CRA related loans do not carry a higher
proportion of credit enhancements, banks do not incur greater costs in the event of
default. Therefore, banks have an added incentive to originate risky CRA loans.
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CHAPTER THREE

AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE CHANGING LENDING
STANDARDS OF GSES AND PRIVATE FIRMS IN THE
SECONDARY MARKET BETWEEN 2001 AND 2006

Introduction

Firms with widely divergent regulatory structures compete for mortgages on the
secondary market. Specifically, private securitizers compete with government-sponsored
giants, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. For 30 years these firms operated as privately
owned public utilities. Although they raised capital on the private market, they enjoyed
special regulatory protections and advantages. In return for these advantages, they were
required to purchase loans to low and middle-income (LMI) households in prescribed
proportions. This paper investigates the types of loans the primary lenders kept28 and the
types sold to GSEs and private firms on the secondary market.

I predictably find that lenders are less likely to originate refinance loans, subprime
loans and subordinate lien or unsecured loans. However once they have been originated,
lenders are more likely to keep these kinds of loans. Against the benchmark of the
28

Primary lenders may keep the loans it does not sell on the balance sheet or they may create their own mortgage-backed securities.
In the case of the latter, the primary lender is often still exposed to downside risk through the guarantees and credit enhancements
offered on securitized loans.
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primary lender retaining a loan, I use a multinomial logit regression to compare the
likelihood that a loan may either find its way to a wholly private securitizer or the publicprivate chimaeras, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The results also indicate that Fannie
Mae engages in buying risky loans as measured by higher loan amount to income ratios.
In 2005 and 2006, each unit increase in the ratio of the loan amount to income, increased
the probability of Fannie Mae purchasing the loan by 0.11%.

I also use a nested logit regression to measure how the probabilities of
origination, retention and to sell to a GSE change from 2001 until 2006. The results
reflect the increasing intensity of competition in the secondary market after 2003. The
probability of selling a loan to a GSE, conditional on the institutions decision not to keep
it, declines from 67% to 35% between 2001 and 2006. The extent of competition in the
secondary market has profound implications for GSEs because of their unique regulatory
structure and incentives.

3.1 Overview of the Primary and Secondary Markets for Mortgages

Banks and mortgage companies do not keep all the loans that they originate and
purchase on their balance sheet29. Figure 3.1 displays the number of loans held and sold
to different firms on the secondary market between 2001 and 2006. Lenders typically
29

When an institution alienates a loan it is often not an outright sale, ownership may revert to the institution if the loan does not
perform within limits set by the contract at the time of sale.
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held between 27% and 38% of the loans they originated and purchased over this period.
The lenders sold between 15% and 37% of their loans to GSEs. In 2001, lenders sold
over 16 times as many loans to GSEs as they did to private securitizers. By 2006, that
multiple had dwindled to 2.4. The secondary market seems to have become more
competitive between 2001 and 2006.

FIGURE 3.1
Number of New Loans held and sold on the Secondary Market between 2001 and 2006

Source: HMDA Loan Application Register Data

Many institutions choose to exchange their loan stock for cash and mortgagebacked securities (MBS). Loans are purchased and repackaged as MBS on the secondary
market. The same banks that sold the loans to be repackaged on the secondary market
often purchase these MBS. The minimum ratio of equity to debt is regulated according to
the kind of assets that banks hold. AA rated MBS require a 1.6% rate of capitalization,
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while residential mortgages require 4%. Assuming that debt is cheaper than equity30,
banks can lower their cost of capital by selling loans and purchasing MBS on the
secondary market. The provisions of the Basel II accord of 2004 would have eliminated
this advantage to MBS if it had been widely adopted31.

Mortgage companies, Federal Home Loan Banks, the largest commercial banks
and securities trading firms compete with the GSEs on the secondary market. GSEs are
able to raise capital more cheaply than these entities. Studies estimate that the GSEs debt
is between 25 and 29 basis points below banking sector bonds that are AA rated
(Ambrose and Warga, 2002). An equity to asset ratio of less than 4% for both GSEs
corroborates these findings. At this juncture it is necessary to address the reasons for the
regulatory advantages GSEs enjoy and their overall regulatory environment.

3.2 GSEs: Background and Regulatory Framework

The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home
Loan Corporation (Freddie Mac) dominate the secondary market, these firms are
collectively called government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). The GSEs were initially
wholly government owned and operated entities. Fannie Mae was created during the
Great Depression to purchase government guaranteed loans. Between 1968 and 2007,
30
31

Assuming that the provisions of Modigliani and Miller do not hold exactly in the “real world”
Widespread adoption of the Basel II accord has been postponed, pending further discussion since 2004.
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Fannie Mae was privately owned and funded and no longer purchased government
guaranteed loans. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 in order to provide liquidity to the
secondary market. The privately funded GSEs enjoyed a variety of federally granted
advantages over their competitors in the secondary market. The federal government
expressly did not guarantee GSE debt and securities, however it conferred so many
protections upon the GSEs that investors behaved as though the debt and securities are
guaranteed. (see below)

The GSEs are exempt from state and local income taxes. The securities they issue
are classified as government securities. This means that they may be purchased in
unlimited amounts by banks. Government securities are exempt form SEC registration
and reporting requirements. However Fannie Mae voluntarily registered its securities
with the SEC in 2003. The treasury has the right to purchase $2.25 bn. of GSE securities
and the Federal Reserve may purchase the securities as part of their open market
operations. The value of the bundle of protections and advantages bestowed upon the
GSEs is often referred to as a “halo” or charter value.

It is the stated intention of the regulatory structure to pass on lower borrowing
costs to households and to encourage home ownership. GSEs pay for their lower
borrowing costs by meeting the loan purchase targets set for them by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Table 3.1 contains the HUD goals and GSE
performance from 2001 until 2007. The numbers represent the percentage of all GSE
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purchases in a given year that must be devoted to home purchase loans32 to LMI
households.
TABLE 3.1
Overview of GSEs Housing Performance 2001-2007

The LMI goal is set higher after 2000 and then increases steadily after 2004. In
Figure 3.2 the bars labeled “Actual Market” represent the HUD estimates of the actual
LMI market for mortgages. Between 2004 and 2008, the GSE LMI goals rise 49% to
54% and the HUD estimates of the size of the market fall from 58% to 52%. In 2007 and
2008, the GSEs were required support the collapsing market by purchasing troubled
mortgages. The GSE goals therefore exceed the estimated market share.

32

Not refinance
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FIGURE 3.2
GSE Goals and Performance (1996-2009)

source: GSE Report Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010)

Between 2003 and 2007 the GSEs routinely met the LMI goals. In 2005 the HUD
estimated that the GSEs would have to originate an additional 400,000 qualifying loans to
meet their goals. (HUD, 2005) 400,000 loans are less than 10% of the number loans
they financed in 2005 and represent approximately a 2% rise in the LMI goal. (Mortgage
Banking, 2005) The margin by which the GSE exceeded their goals fell after 2001, from
between 3% and 6% to between 1% and 3%. This indicates that the HUD goals were
becoming more burdensome after 2001.
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3.3 GSE Conforming Loans

The GSEs buy only loans that meet prescribed requirements to create a kind of
uniformity in the loans in the MBS they sell and to control the credit risk of the MBS
pool. In order for a loan to be a conforming loan, the applicant must supply certain
documentation and must not exceed prescribed debt-to-income ratios. Traditionally, loans
eligible for purchase by a GSE required a 20% down payment and did not carry payments
exceeding 28% of monthly income and total debt servicing costs did not exceed 36% of
income33. The property value must also not exceed a certain threshold. The threshold
depends upon the average MSA property price and the number of families that the home
is built for. The threshold exceeds the loan amount of 95% of home values34. The
intention of the threshold is to preclude the purchase of “jumbo loans”, or home loans
that are over $400,000.

However, there was erosion in GSE underwriting standards35 and conforming
loan requirements. Deficiencies in the percentage down payment could be compensated
for on other dimensions of loan quality and vice versa. The ambiguity in the GSE
conforming loan algorithm favored a general lowering of lending standards. GSEs
offered brokers incentives to persuade borrowers to accept higher rates of interest in
return for lower down payments36.
This is known as the 23-36 front-back rule.
Measured as a percentage of total applications in excess of $400,000 in 2004.
35
Fannie Mae CEO Daniel Mudd testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010 that underwriting standards began to
slip in 2004, despite the contrary intentions of the executive.
36
This type of monetary incentive is called a Yield Spread Premium.
33
34
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3.4 The GSEs, Risk and Moral Hazard

GSEs receive government protection from insolvency and, through lowering
borrowing costs, government protection from competition. These twin protections have
opposing implications for risk taking. The latent 37guarantee on GSE debt and MBS
obligations has clear moral hazard implications. GSEs are said to have a government
protected charter value. Much of the theory of risk taking and charter value is adapted to
GSEs from the banking literature.

Technically, the charter value would be measured by a Tobin’s Q type
measurement. Passmore (2005) estimated the present value of the stream of future charter
benefits to shareholders to be $79 million. A 2004 Congressional Budget Office study
estimated the charter benefit to be $19.6 bn for the single year of 2003. The same study
accrued $13.4bn. of this benefit to consumers, through lower rates of interest, and $6.2
bn. of this benefit to shareholders. The $6.2 bn. benefit to shareholders for 2003 is
consistent with the Passmore study using a 7% discount rate. This was not an
unreasonable estimate at the time of the study. It falls between the return on equities of
8.86% and the return on debt of 4.7%38. (Damodaran, 2006)

Theory predicts that risk taking is inversely proportional to charter value. Owners
avoid making decisions that have large down side risk to avoid insolvency and the loss of
37

The use of the adjective “latent” is mine. “tacit” or “implied” are usually used to describe the GSE guarantee. They do not capture
expressed denial by at least one party. Latent, defined as potentially existing but not presently evident or realized, is more appropriate.
38
Using 2001-2006 data
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the charter value provided there is a credible threat that they will lose their interest in the
case of insolvency. The charter value is held to be the sum of the going concern value
and the value of the real option of taking risks and avoiding losing ownership if a
negative outcome is realized. Boyd and Nicolo (2005) argue charter value could be
positively related to risk seeking because market power in the loan market could lead to
charging higher interest rates and higher probability of default.

Empirical investigations that regress the Tobin’s Q for banks on earnings
volatility find in favor of an inverse relationship between charter value and risk taking.
(Demsetz, Saidenberg, and Strathan, 1996; Allen and Rai, 1996) A body that is separate
from the HUD is responsible for overseeing GSE safety and soundness. The Office of
Federal Housing Oversight (OFHEO) was established in 1992 to set and monitor rates of
capitalization and GSE activities. The GSEs are required to capitalize at a rate equal to
the greater of the sum of 2.5% of their on balance sheet assets and 0.45% of their off
balance sheet assets OR a percentage proportional to the capital required to sustain
operations for 10 years in the event of shocks to the interest rate39, as measured by “stress
tests”. In addition to these capital requirements, GSEs were required to hold 30% above
the minimum requirements to cover operating risks, such as losses due to fraud and
negligence. However, the protection provided by these regulations depends upon the
accounting standards employed by the GSEs and inversely to the degree regulatory
laxity. Both GSEs experienced accounting scandals between 2003 and 2004 and Fannie
39

Stress tests, or estimates of the distribution of loss given default, were typically conducted for a 75% increase in the interest rate or a
50% decline in interest rates.
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Mae was notorious for recognizing delinquencies when payments were 24 months past
their due date40 (GSE Report, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2010) and for using
“cookie jar” reserves to delay recognizing income until it was necessary to offset losses.
Fannie was said to have a corporate culture that expressly emphasized performance
smoothing over fidelity to accounting standards (Haggerty et. al. (2004)). The inputs to a
model of risk-based capital were therefore flawed. Therefore, the models deliberately
underestimated the variance in performance.

The literature tells us that risk aversion is proportional to charter value and
inversely related to competition, but it does not give an indication of the relative value of
the charter or the extent of the competition. Frame and White (2007) purport that the
entry of Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB) into the secondary market and the adoption
of Basel II would lead to a reduction in the charter value and an increase in risk taking
behavior by the GSEs. Frame and White state that the most cost effective way for the
GSEs to take on more risk is by using riskier financial instruments and arrangements and
not by lowering conforming loan standards41. However, it should be noted that defaults
on Fannie Mae loans (Figure 3.3) are negatively correlated with the decline in Fannie
Mae’s market share as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.3 below shows that loans
originated from 2004 onwards had higher rates of default than loans originated before
that time. It should be noted that the low default rates in 2002 and 2003 are attributable

40

Commercial banks are required to recognize delinquencies when payments are more than 30 days overdue.
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to the questionable accounting practices employed by Fannie Mae at that time and
exposed in 2004.

FIGURE 3.3
Fannie Mae Defaults by Year of Origination and Quarters after Origination

Source: Fannie Mae Credit Summary Q2, 2009

Figure 3.4 shows the rate of default on first lien loans secured by real estate for
commercial banks between 2002 and 200642.

42

There was an accounting change in the measurement of defaults after 2001. 2001 has been omitted as it is not directly comparable.

75

FIGURE 3.4
Default Rate for Commercial Banks on First Lien loans secured by Real Estate (2002-2006)

Source: FFIEC Call Report

By comparing figures 3.3 and 3.4, we see that although the default rate on loans
held by commercial banks is higher than that for GSEs, the rate for GSEs is increasing
while the rate for commercial banks is not. This pattern suggests that while the lending
standards for commercial banks stayed relatively stable between 2003 and 2006, lending
standards for GSEs fell after 2003. If we read Figure 3.3 in conjunction with the GSE
LMI goals, we see that the increase in GSE LMI purchases and goals in 2001 corresponds
to a decline is default rates. There appears to be a positive correlation between GSE
goals, performance and default rates after 2004, even if we ignore the questionable pre2004 accounting. Figures 3.5.1 and 3.5.2 track the relationship between the GSE default
rate and the HUD goals.

76

FIGURES 3.5.1 &3.5.2
GSE Goals, Performance and Default Rates

The coincidence of the decline in lending standards by the GSEs and the increase
in competition in the secondary market is consistent with Frame and White’s hypothesis.
There is also an indication that default rates after 2004 are related to LMI mortgage goals
and purchases. The decline in GSE lending standards after 2004 can therefore be
attributed, in uncertain proportions, to both market and regulatory forces.

3.5 Trends and Data Description

The loan application data is from the Loan Application Registers (LAR) that
lenders in metropolitan areas are required to complete for all their loan applications. The
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires lenders to keep LARs. LARs record
the income and race of the applicant, the loan amount and the decision by the bank to
originate, purchase or deny the application. If the lender intends to sell the loan to a
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GSE, another bank, private securitizer or mutual fund, this is recorded on the LAR.
GSEs43 provide free software that indicates whether a loan is eligible for sale to the GSE
at the time of application.

From 2005, the LAR required the lender to record the demographic and income
characteristics of the census tract where the home in question is located. Between 27
million and 41 million home loan applications were filed each year between 2001 and
2006. The acceptance rate over this period of time is illustrated in Figure 3.6.

FIGURE 3.6
Originations and Purchases as a Fraction of Total Applications between 2001 and 2006

Source: HMDA Data

Figure 3.6 shows that a large number of applications for new loans are accepted.
It also shows that the percentage of origination fell after 2003. It also showed that after
43

Private securitizers usually charge for their approval software.
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2003, the rate at which loans were purchased from other institutions increased.
Typically, the average applicant income for loans originated and kept by the lender and
loans sold to private securitizers is higher than the applicant income for loans sold to
GSEs. Figure 3.7 below shows the average applicant income over time.

FIGURE 3.7
Average Income by Loan Destination

Source: HMDA

Figure 3.7 shows the average income of Fannie Mae borrowers tracks closely
with Freddie Mac borrowers. The average income of borrowers whose loans are kept by
the bank and sold to private securitizers exceeds that of those sold to GSEs throughout
the period. Unfortunately, the HMDA data does not capture credit scores. However,
examination of the loan to income ratio gives some idea of the riskiness of the loans.
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FIGURE 3.8
Loan Amount to Income Ratio by Loan Destination

Source: HMDA

Reading Figures 3.7 and 3.8 together we see that lenders typically keep loans with
a higher average income and a lower loan amount to income ratio. Ostensibly riskier
investments are moved to the secondary market. Between 2003 and 2006, the loan to
income ratio for GSEs rises, while the ratio rises and falls for lenders and private
securitizers.
Figure 3.9 graphs the change in median US home price by region between 2001
and 2008. Between 2001 and 2002, 11 of 159 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
experienced a decrease in median home price, between 2005 and 2004 only 4 MSAs
experienced a decline. The steady increase in the median house price between 2001 and
2005 fueled a speculative market.
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FIGURE 3.9
Median Home Price for US and by Region

Source: National Assocition of Realtors

However, by 2006 signs of general decline emerged as 35 MSAs showed a
decline in median home value. As a crude barometer of speculative activity one may
note that between 2001 and 2006 total applications grew by 23% and applications for
non-owner occupied housing grew by 131%. The trajectory of median home prices is
important not only because of speculative activity on the one side, but also because the
willingness of lenders to approve applications is influenced by the value of the assets
pledged as security.
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3.6 A Brief Account of Some of the Variables

The “no recourse” provision

In some states, in the event of a foreclosure, lenders are not permitted to claim
any assets of the borrowers apart from the house. Such a limitation on the rights of the
lender is called a no recourse provision. A dummy variable equal to 1 indicates if the
loan application arose in a state where such recourse against the borrower is not
permitted44.

HOEPA loans

The Home Owner Equity Protection Act (1994) protects subprime borrowers,
whose debt is secured by their home, from dramatic changes to the terms of their
repayments. A loan is said to have HOEPA status if either the annual percentage rate
(APR) or the sum of any amount paid to lower the interest rate and the fees exceeds a
“trigger” amount45 over and above the treasury with a comparable maturity at the time of
origination. If a loan has HOEPA status, the borrower is protected against balloon
payments and hikes in the rate of interest that exceed levels prescribed by HOEPA.

44

The “no recourse” states are: AK, AZ, AR, CA, CO, DC, GA, HI, ID, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, OR, TN, TX, VA, WA, WV.
The trigger amount during the period in question was 8% APR for first lien loans and 10% APR for subordinate lien loans. Fees
and payments for reductions in the rate of interest could not exceed 8% of the outstanding amount for first and subordinate lien loans.
45
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Mortgage Companies

Mortgage companies do not have to satisfy demand deposits and are not subject to
the same regulatory requirements and scrutiny as banks and thrifts.

FHA Loans

A mortgage guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Lowincome applicants who do not qualify for private mortgage insurance (PMI) and who
cannot afford a down payment are granted FHA loans if the FHA determines that the loan
is not too risky. The FHA agrees to pay any unpaid principal to the lending institution
and the lender pays an insurance premium to the FHA.

Ginnie Mae Loans

The Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was created to
assume the role that Fannie Mae was originally intended for, to purchase FHA loans.
Unlike the MBS of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae’s MBS are expressly
government guaranteed. Ginnie Mae was created in 1968, at the time that Fannie Mae
was “privatized”.
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3.7 Empirical Investigation: Multinomial Logit

I make use of a multinomial logit model to estimate the marginal effects of loan
characteristics, borrower characteristics, lender characteristics and the demographic data
for the tract where the property is located on the fate of a particular loan application. A
random sample of 338,283 loan applications was taken from the 2005 and 2006 LAR
data46. The summary statistics can be found in Table D1 of Appendix D. The
coefficients will indicate whether an independent variable makes it more or less likely
that a loan will be allocated to a particular buyer, relative to the base case of being kept
by the lender. By comparing the estimated marginal effects we can tell something about
the relative appetitive of the purchasers for different kinds of loans.

A loan application can be denied, originated and kept by the bank, originated and
sold to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, a private securitizer or some other buyer.
By comparing the marginal effects for Ginnie Mae, the GSEs and private securitizers we
can understand how the intensity of government protection influences the incentives to
take risk in the secondary market. The possible outcomes are:

46

2005 and 2006 applications had fields that captured the demographic data for the location of the property to be purchased or
borrowed against.
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Number
0

TABLE 3.2
Possible Values for the Dependent Variable
Outcome
Notes
Loan Application is Denied
-

1

Loan is Originated and kept by the bank

2

Loan is sold to Fannie Mae

The lender keeps the loan or the bank
chooses to securitize the loan in house.
The lender sells the loan to Fannie Mae in
return for MBS or cash. No obligations
remain on the part of the lender.

3

Loan is sold to Freddie Mac

As above

4

Loan sold to Ginnie Mae

The government owned entity buys the
loan.

5

Loan is sold to private securitizer

The bank may still service the loan, the
loan could revert back to the bank in the
event of default.

6

Other Purchaser

For example credit unions, mutual funds,
insurance corporations.

The independent variables are selected to capture the risk of the loan and the
appetite for risk by the lender. Table 3.3 lists some of the independent variables and the
justification for their inclusion. Not all variables have been listed as some do not require
any explanation.
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Variable
Loan Amount/Income

TABLE 3.3
Selected Independent Variables
Explanation
A measurement of the risk attached to the
loan. The higher the loan amount
relative to income, the riskier the loan.

Refinance Loans

Borrowers use refinance loans to pay off
existing loans to take advantage of lower
interest rates and better terms. Often
distressed borrowers use this option,
these loans could be riskier than
conventional loans.

Non-owner Occupied Housing

Borrowers are more likely to walk away
from properties they don’t live in.
Sensitive to systematic risk.

HOEPA status

High interest sub prime loans, lenders are
not permitted to adjust interest rates and
terms as they please.

FHA

Government guaranteed sub prime loans.

Subordinate Lien

Lender will get paid after the other
creditors in the event of liquidation.
Risky Loan.

Median MSA Home Price

An indication of the value of the property
that secures the loan. The more valuable
the property, the more to be recouped in a
liquidation.

Income/Median MSA Income

An indication of risk, a borrower living
above his means.

Tract to MSA Income Ratio

A measurement of the affluence of the
neighborhood where the property is
located.

Mortgage Companies

Mortgage companies do not have to
satisfy demand deposits, they are likely
to be less risk averse than banks
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The values of the estimated marginal effects for the secondary markets players
relative to the base case of keeping the loan indicates the propensity of the different
purchasers to take risks in the secondary markets.

The results for the unordered multinomial logistic regression are presented in
Appendix D. Column (1) of Table D1 indicates that lenders are selective when it comes
to loans with high loan amounts relative to applicant income, refinance loans, loans with
subordinate lien provisions and unsecured loans. HOEPA loan applications are 33% less
likely to be denied than they are to be originated and kept on the books.

Column (4) shows Ginnie Mae fulfilling its role of purchasing FHA loans.

Examining the coefficients on Loan Amount/ Income in columns (2) and (3) to
column (5) reveals that it is more probable that loans with higher Loan Amount to
Income ratios are sold to Fannie Mae than they are to be kept by the lender. The GSEs
are less likely than private securitizers to purchase unsecured loans, loans with
subordinate liens and refinance loans. Calculated at the sample means, HOEPA loan
applications are 27% less likely to be denied and more likely to stay in the possession of
the lender. Mortgage companies are more likely to use private securitizers than GSEs.

The regression suggests that if GSEs wanted to increase their risk exposure they
would do so by accepting loans with high loan to income ratios as opposed to refinance
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loans and loans for no-owner occupied housing. Separate multinomial logit models were
run for each year from 2001 until 2006. Figure 3.10 compares the marginal effects of an
increase in the ratio of loan amount to income, measured at the sample means, on the
probability of a loan being sold of Fannie Mae and to Private Securitizers each year.

FIGURE 3.10
A Comparison of the Estimated Marginal Effects of Loan Amount/Income on the Sale of a
Loan to Fannie Mae and Private Securitizers (2001-2006)

The estimated marginal effects for the Fannie Mae equations were statistically
different from zero at the one percent level every year from 2001 until 2006. The
estimated marginal effects for the private securitizer equations were not. Between 2001
and 2006, Fannie Mae had a greater appetite than private securitizers for loan with higher
loan amount to income ratios. Figure 3.10 does not show a systematic deterioration in
Fannie Mae’s lending standards, as measured by the ratio of loan amount to income. Nor
does it show a decline in lending standards for private securitizers. Figure 3.3 indicates
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that there must have been continual detioration in lending standards after 2004. Figure
3.10 suggests that this detioration must have been on some other margin than purchasing
loans with higer loan amount to income ratios.

3.8 Empirical Investigation: Nested Logit

The multinomial logit model is attractive for its simplicity but assumes that there
is no correlation between the error terms of the different outcome equations. The
multinomial logit model suffers from the assumption of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives IIA). This assumption is not reasonable for the given problem, changes in
reserve requirements for different kinds of mortgage back securities will effect not only
the likelihood of keeping a loan, but it will also effect how many are sold to GSEs and
how many are sold to private securitizers. I employ a nested logit model to partially relax
the IIA assumption by grouping different sets of alternatives together. The nesting
structure used is presented in Figure 3.11.
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FIGURE 3.11
Nested Logit Structure for the Outcome of a Loan Application

The loan application is either denied or rejected in the first stage, originated loans
are either kept or sold and loans that are sold are sold to either GSEs or private
institutions. The IIA assumptions are relaxed across nests but not within nests. Ginnie
Mae loans were omitted because private firms or securitizers seldom, if ever, buy FHA
loans. The categories or private securitizing firms and private firms were collapsed into a
single category. Loans sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were collapsed into a single
GSE outcome. The choices of purchaser have been reduced to two to eliminate the
danger of imposing the IIA assumption. A 2% random sample of non-FHA and VA
applications was taken from the population of applications.

A nested logit model was run for every year from 2001 until 2006, the results are
presented in Table E3 of Appendix E. Tables E1 and E2 of Appendix E show the
incidence and proportion of different outcomes in the sample by year. Table E1 in
Appendix E shows that the number of applications in the sample climbs every year, with
the exception of 2006. The rate of origination increases between 2001 and 2003 and
90

declines after 2003. In 2003 the originating institutions retained the highest number and
the lowest proportion of mortgages. The proportion of mortgage sold to GSEs declines
from 67% in 2002 to 36% in 2006. Banks are therefore originating a lower proportion of
a higher number of applications every year. The rate of retention falls and rises over the
period in question and the proportion and number of loans sold to GSEs declines
throughout.

Although the outcomes can easily be grouped into in subsets that are suitable for a
nested logit regression, the independent variables do not fall into categories that
correspond to the different nests. For instance, the applicants income and the loan
amount are not exclusively relevant to the origination decision or the retention decision
but to all decisions. Therefore the independent variables were located to the first nest so
that the outcome of all applications could be conditioned upon them instead of only the
subsample of originated or sold loans.

Table E3 in Appendix E presents the coefficients of the first stage of the nested
logit. The first stage is the origination decision, the denial outcome was used as the base
and the coefficients are interpreted as the change in the log odds of origination, relative to
denial, due to a change in the independent variable, holding all others constant. All
coefficients are significant at least at the 5% level. The first row of Table E3 shows the
declining value of income as a predictor or origination after 2001. The regression
suggests that once a lender takes on a risky loan, it is more likely to hold or perhaps to
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securitize the loan in house. A possible explanation is that lenders have access to more
information about the credit worthiness of borrowers of many riskier mortgage products.
In 2001, a $1,000 increase in income increases the log odds of origination by 0.4%. In
2006, the change in the log odds of origination is only 0.09% for a $1,000 increase in
income.

Lenders measure the ability of an applicant to meet their obligations by the
fraction of debt service to monthly income. This measurement of credit risk will be
correlated with the ratio of the loan amount to annual income. Row 3 of Table E3 shows
that applications that record a higher loan amount relative to annual income are less likely
result in origination. If the relationship between this ratio and credit risk were stable over
time, then row 3 would suggest that lenders were the least risk averse in 2002 and
tightened their standards slightly in 2006.

It is reasonable to expect that the current value and expected future value of the
underlying property will influence the lenders decisions to originate the loan. HMDA
does not collect home value. I employed the median home price of the MSA where the
property is located and a dummy variable (West) to indicate if the property was located in
one of the western states or Florida to capture the value of the home and to indicate
whether an appreciation in the value of the home could be expected. Both variables had
positive coefficients in the origination equation, however the dummy for the western state
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and Florida exhibited greater economic significance. In 2004 the fact that an application
was for a property in one of these states increased the log odds of origination by 12%.

Distressed borrowers often apply for refinance loans, refinance loans therefore are
less likely to be originated. After 2004, the absolute value of the coefficient for refinance
loans increases by 8 fold. Non-owner occupied housing includes speculative properties.
An application for a loan to buy non-occupied housing is more likely to be originated
than applications for primary residences. Applicants with enough income to service an
additional property are likely to be wealthier and to have better credit ratings.

Mortgage companies employ electronic and telephonic applications, which are
less costly for a household to make. Mortgage companies received more applications and
have a greater denial rate than depository institutions because of their application media.
Although the application technology is constant throughout this period, in 2005 and 2006
the change in the log odds of origination for an application at a mortgage company
declined. This could indicate a possible lowering of standards at mortgage companies.

Figure E4 in Appendix E shows the conditional probabilities from the logistic
regression for selected outcomes. The first graph shows the unconditional probability of
origination from 2001 until 2006. The second graph shows the probability of a loan
being sold, conditional on origination. The third graph shows the probability of selling
an unretained loan to a GSE. The probability of denial, the conditional probability of
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selling a loan and selling a loan to a private institution are respective mirror images of the
graphs shown. The graphs in Figure E4 show that the probability of origination peaks in
2003 before reverting to its 2001 level. The probability of retaining a loan conditional on
it origination stays fairly constant throughout the period. The third figure shows the
declining market share of GSEs between 2001 and 2006. The probability that a loan is
sold to a GSE, conditional on its begin sold decreases from 67% in 2001 to only 35% in
2006.

3.9 Concluding Remarks

The 2003 surge in the purchase of new loans by Fannie Mae and, to a lesser
extent Freddie Mac, is not explained by any change in the observable characteristics of
the lender or loan characteristics. Therefore, GSE appetites for loans appear to be driven
by regulatory impulses. The fact that over 4 million originations can be driven by nonmarket forces and that GSE lending standards declined after 2003 suggests that many
risky loans were originated because of the GSEs. The decline in lending standards that
was illustrated in Figure 3.3 is reflected in the propensity of GSEs to purchase mortgages
with higher loan amount to income ratios. The multinomial logit regression estimates
that an increase in the loan amount to income ratio of a single unit increases the
probability that a loan application will be sold to Fannie Mae by 0.11%. Private
securitizers purchase loans from applicants with higher incomes and are slightly less
likely to purchase a loan as the loan amount to income ratio rises.

94

GSE LMI targets and the propensity of GSEs to purchase loans with higher loan
amount to income ratios add a new dimension to the findings in Chapters One and Two.
The secondary market enables the origination of risky loans by banks. Banks under CRA
pressure change their lending patterns as they merge and securitize $260 worth of assets
for every $1,000 of merger value. GSEs are required to purchase LMI loans to fulfill
their HUD goals and are more likely to buy loans with high loan amount to income ratios
than any other kind of institution.
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CONCLUSION
The three chapters in this dissertation present strong circumstantial
evidence that both the supply and demand for risky loans was influenced, to a large
extent, by regulation. The complimentarily of these regulations is not coincidental.
Banks are expressly given credit for originating and purchasing, but not for holding CRA
related loans. GSEs are given credit for purchasing them. These regulatory measures are
designed to work in concert to expand home ownership for LMI households. With two
such compelling regulatory measures working for the same goal it is hardly surprising
that over $2 trillion was allocated to bad mortgages.

The secondary market lowered the cost of originating risky loans. Chapter One
shows that lending to LMI households changed for CRA regulated firms around the time
of a merger. Chapter Two shows that investors did not demand credit enhancements
commensurate with the increased riskiness of the securitized pool of assets. Chapter
Three presents evidence that GSEs had lower lending standards than private securitizers
in order to fulfill their HUD quotas. Between $141bn and $983.3bn additional mortgages
were originated in order for banks to comply with the provisions of the CRA. These
numbers exceed what they would have been if the secondary market had not enabled LMI
household loans. Chapter One shows that the regulatory framework facilitated strategic
origination on the part of banks as opposed to a general lowering of lending standards.
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Appendix A
Summary Statistics
TABLE A1
Summary Statistics - Banks
Variable
Total Number of

# Observations

Mean

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

Deviation

Value

Value

766

20676.89

147349.9

15

2942238

665

16196.17

106413.9

1

1551447

766

13777.31

99379.14

14

1960851

665

10864.53

72287.78

1

992818

Total Purchased

766

2862.798

27267.33

0

635801

Purchased within

665

1394.642

10442.59

0

167909

Total Denials

766

3496.222

22008.17

0

442059

Denials in AA

665

2913.992

17508.57

0

280856

Total Applications

766

1117.697

7194.9

0

101129

665

930.3398

5912.999

0

82438

766

364.4452

2049.75

0

23997

665

310.4226

1723.58

0

19550

766

12229.2

90170.83

2

1719861

665

10586.38

77173.65

0

1264578

Applications
Applications
within AA†
Total Originated
and Purchased
Originated and
Purchased within
AA

AA

Black Applicants
Applications
Black Applicants
within AA
Denial of Black
Applicants
Denial of Black
Applicants within
AA
Total Applications
White Applicants
Applications
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White Applicants
within AA
Denial of White

766

1968.223

14497.97

0

320657

665

1674.403

11705.94

0

216724

766

3209.832

26900.96

0

657543

665

1745.391

9884.086

0

168418

766

422.1018

2180.947

0

26759

766

270.7467

1545.407

0

24561

Ever Pledge

766

.1072363

.3095484

0

1

Applications LMI

196

26877.45

13580.27

11

1184245

196

17663.11

91697.87

8

821500

196

23397.79

126263.2

4

168418

196

15425.49

85816.9

3

778715

766

10585.57

75942.98

0

1571693

665

8431.171

55677.96

0

965966

766

7109.021

51012.63

0

994645

Applicants
Denial of White
Applicants within
AA
Total Applications
No Race Given
Applications No
Race Given
Applicants within
AA
Denial of No Race
Applicants
Denial of No Race
Applicants

Households
Originations LMI
Households
Applications LMI
Households
within AA
Originations LMI
Households
within AA
Applications
Refinance Loans
Applications
Refinance Loans
within AA
Origination
Refinance Loans
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Originations

665

5562.565

36934.31

0

618016

Refinance Loans
within AA
† AA denotes assessment area

TABLE A2
Summary Statistics – Mortgage Companies
Variable
Total Number

# Observations

Mean

Standard

Minimum

Maximum

Deviation

Value

Value

188

110344.4

427360.2

6

2824152

188

61438.56

306865.1

0

2414722

188

25955.07

160134.6

0

1302495

Total Denials

188

17829.93

80991.85

0

617517

Total

188

8521.378

31234.69

0

211492

188

1936.027

7956.633

0

58253

188

54453.72

246553

0

1864939

188

7189.473

33705.52

0

307538

188

6939.218

36614.21

0

321457

of Applications
Total
Originated and
Purchased
Total
Purchased

Applications
Black
Applicants
Denial of
Black
Applicants
Total
Applications
White
Applicants
Denial of
White
Applicants
Total
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Applications
No Race Given
Denial of No

188

857.4468

7145.469

0

95028

63

126657.3

450147.5

9

2233396

63

66454

304788.4

0

1743167

188

74154.79

289509.2

0

1992411

188

34759.75

176640.9

0

1703567

Race
Applicants
Applications
LMI
Households
Originations
LMI
Households
Applications
Refinance
Loans
Origination
Refinance
Loans
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Appendix B
Chapter 1: Results
TABLE B1
Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Black Applicants by Banks
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Black Denial

Black Denial

(BDR) Inside

(BDR) Outside

Rate

Rate (BDR)

AA†

AA

Pooled

Panel (FE)

Panel (FE)

Panel (FE)

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

(se)

Ever Pledge*

-0.094***

-0.043

-0.104**

0.031*

Merger (T+1)

(0.054)

(0.031)

(0.042)

(0.019)

Ever Pledge

0.161**

0.169**

0.212**

-0.011

(0.041)

(0.076)

(0.089)

(0.02)

0.052

0.026

0.016

0.005

(0.027)

(0.018)

(0.021)

(0.01)

0.025

0.007

0.044*

-0.024*

(0.028)

(0.019)

(0.023)

(0.013)

0.0743

0.043**

0.043*

0.003

(0.043)

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.003)

-0.002

-0.01

-0.015

-0.000

(0.017)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.007)

-0.017

0.053

0.043

0.006

(0.019)

(0.036)

(0.042)

(0.011)

0.234***

0.123***

0.14***

-0.007

(0.035)

(0.071)

(0.081)

(0.019)

N

688

688

571

571

Groups

-

157

154

154

F

8.79

1.86

2.06

0.87

Cluster Variable

-

Bank

Bank

Bank

Merger (T)
Merger (T+1)
Merger Protest
Exam
CRA Rating
Constant

† AA denotes assessment area
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE B2
Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to White Applicants by Bank

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

White Denial Rate

WDR

WDR Inside

WDR Outside

AA†

AA

(WDR)
Pooled

Panel

Panel

Panel

Regression

(FE)

(FE)

(FE)

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

(se)

Ever Pledge*

-0.048

-0.03

-0.023*

-0.009

Merger (T+1)

(0.27)

(0.01)

(0.014)

(0.007)

0.084**

0.07**

0.075***

0.005

(0.033)

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.009)

0.017*

-0.009

0.014***

-0.004

(0.010)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.003)

0.021**

0.006

0.00

0.004

(0.010)

(0.007)

(0.006)

(0.006)

0.059***

0.027

0.02*

0.005

(0.021)

(0.011)

(0.012)

(0.03)

-0.003

-0.004

-0.008**

0.00

(0.004)

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

-0.018

-0.016

-0.011

0.000

(0.011)

(0.009)

(0.008)

(0.003)

0.12

0.119

0.111***

0.002

(0.021)

(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.006)

N

761

761

660

660

Groups

-

162

160

160

F

7.69

4.24

3.98

0.74

Cluster Variable

-

Bank

Bank

Bank

Ever Pledge
Merger (T)
Merger (T+1)
Merger Protest
Exam
CRA Rating
Constant

† AA denotes assessment area
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE B3
Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Applicants who do not Disclose their Race
by Banks
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

“No Race” Denial

NRDR

NRDR Inside

NRDR Outside

AA†

AA

Rate (NRDR)
Pooled

Panel

Panel

Panel

Regression

(FE)

(FE)

(FE)

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

(se)

Ever Pledge*

-0.00149

0.0609

0.0175

-0.0056

Merger (T+1)

(0.0733)

(0.0558)

(0.053)

(0.0167)

Ever Pledge

-0.0027

-0.2935***

-0.2761***

0.0199

(0.0551)

(0.0628)

(0.0574)

(0.0238)

-0.0039

-0.0189

-0.0013

-0.0098

(0.0378)

(0.0308)

(0.0322)

(0.008)

0.0471

0.0150

0.0454

-0.0065

(0.0404)

(0.0339)

(0.0354)

(0.01)

-0.0319

-0.0695*

-0.0725*

0.001

(0.0583)

(0.0416)

(0.0413)

(0.0046)

0.0129

-0.0125

-0.0029

0.0002

(0.0237)

(0.0133)

(0.0147)

(0.007)

0.0526*

-0.0284

0.0137

-0.007

(0.0262)

(0.0698)

(0.0772)

(0.017)

0.1142***

0.3104***

0.2415*

0.0172

(0.0485)

(0.122)

(0.135)

(0.0299)

N

647

647

533

533

Groups

-

157

147

147

F

1.01

4.80

7.64

1.12

Cluster

-

Bank

Bank

Bank

Merger (T)
Merger (T+1)
Merger Protest
Exam
CRA Rating
Constant

Variable
† AA denotes assessment area
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE B4
Effect of CRA and Mergers on Loan Origination to LMI
Applicants for Banks
(a)

(b)

(c)

Change in %

Change in % of

Change in % LMI

LMI Origination

LMI in AA†

Outside AA

Linear

Linear

Linear Regression

Regression

Regression

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

Ever Pledge*

0.052 **

0.063 **

-0.006

Merger (T+1)

(0.025)

(0.031)

(0.005)

-0.045***

-0.058**

0.002

(0.015)

(0.026)

(0.004)

0.016

0.009

-0.007

(0.0163)

(0.022)

(0.005)

-0.021

-0.033

0.01*

(0.025)

(0.033)

(0.005)

-0.012

-0.008

0.002

(0.016)

(0.021)

(0.003)

-0.014

-0.01

0.003

(0.011)

(0.01)

(0.002)

-0.017

-0.022

0.003

(0.018)

(0.025)

(0.003)

0.024

0.047

-0.008

(0.037)

(0.051)

(0.006)

N

136

89

89

R Sq.

0.04

0.06

0.09

Root MSE

0.07

0.076

0.075

Standard Error

Bootstrap

Bootstrap

Bootstrap

Ever Pledge
Merger (T)
Merger (T+1)
Merger Protest
Exam
CRA Rating
Constant

Correction
† AA denotes assessment area
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE B5
Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Origination of Refinance Loans by Banks
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Rate of Refinance

Rate of RLO

RLO

RLO Outside

Inside AA†

AA

Panel

Panel

Panel

(FE)

(FE)

(FE)

Loans Originated
(RLO)
Pooled Regression
Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

(se)

Ever Pledge*

0.025

0.028

0.043**

-0.014***

Merger (T+1)

(0.021)

(0.026)

(0.022)

(0.005)

-0.11

0.005

-0.021

0.015**

(0.025)

(0.041)

(0.032)

(0.006)

-0.001

0.038

0.05***

-0.009

(0.03)

(0.023)

(0.017)

(0.006)

-0.03

-0.005

-0.00

0.000

(0.017)

(0.01)

(0.11)

(0.002)

-0.002

-0.00

0.00

0.001

(0.016)

(0.01)

(0.009)

(0.003)

-0.074

-0.016

-0.023

0.004

(0.027)

(0.022)

(0.02)

(0.004)

0.012

0.00

0.000

0.001

(0.009)

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.003)

0.034

0.039*

0.03

-0.003

(0.011)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.004)

0.763***

0.736***

0.752***

0.000

(0.021)

(0.035)

(0.036)

(0.006)

N

760

760

659

659

Groups

-

162

160

160

F

15.52

1.18

1.97

1.65

Cluster Variable

-

Bank

Bank

Bank

Ever Pledge
Pledge (T)
Merger (T)
Merger (T+1)
Merger Protest
Exam
CRA Rating
Constant

† AA denotes assessment area
*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE B6
Effect of CRA and Mergers on the Percentage Denials to Applicants by Race
(Mortgage Companies)
(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Black Denial

White Denial

“No Race”

Refinance

Rate

Rate

Denial Rate

Loans
Originated as
% Refinance
Applications

Panel

Panel

Panel

Panel

(FE)

(FE)

(FE)

(FE)

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(se)

(se)

(se)

(se)

0.021

0.012

-0.049

0.033

(0.04)

(0.018)

(0.098)

(0.036)

-0.056

-0.04

0.068

0.077***

(0.05)

(0.025)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.167***

0.094***

0.122***

0.71

(0.008)

(0.0025)

(0.005)

(0.005)

N

170

178

125

183

Groups

38

41

35

40

F

2.73

1.22

1.78

3.36

Cluster Variable

Mortgage

Mortgage

Mortgage

Mortgage

Company

Company

Company

Company

Merge (T)

Merge (T+1)

Constant

*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level.
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Appendix C
Chapter 2 Data Sources and Definitions and Sample Statistics

This paper makes use of data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC). The council specifies guidelines and collects data from the four
agencies responsible for bank regulation, the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). There are two kinds of FFIEC data
used above. The data on the timing of CRA exams is taken from the public search engine
on the FFIEC website47. The balance sheet and off-balance sheet data is available on the
bank regulatory Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) website. WRDS collects the
bank regulatory data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income48 (the “Call
Report”) that banks are required to submit to the FFIEC every quarter. Ever national,
FRB member state chartered bank and insured state chartered nonmember bank is
required to file a Call Report every quarter. Banks submit their reports at the close of
business on the last calendar day of the quarter.

Sample Construction
The panel is the constituent of reporting banks that securitize loans. 8,303 banks
submitted Call Reports in the fourth quarter of 2005. 686 of these banks securitized

47
48

http://www.ffiec.gov/CRA/ratings.htm
FFIEC 031 & 041
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assets in the same quarter. 678 of these banks had CRA records49 and filed Call Reports
from the second quarter of 2004 until and including the first quarter of 2006.

Variables

Exam
Exam is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bank has been given a CRA
assessment that quarter.

Assets (RCON2170)
This includes investments in other companies, assets held from trading and all
loans held by the bank. Off-balance sheet assets are, of course, excluded.

Deposits (RCFD2200)
As defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, deposits include all checking,
savings, trusts and money received by the bank. Reciprocal obligations between banks
are netted.

Loans Secured by Real Estate (RCON3385)
The quarterly average of all loans secured by real estate, including home equity
lines of credit, second mortgages etc.

49

Five banks did not receive CRA assessments at the same organizational level at which the filed the Call Report.
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First Lien Real Estate Loans (RCON5367)
Non-revolving loans secured by first claims on real estate on dwellings for 1-4
families.

Junior Lien Real Estate Loans (RCON5368)
Non-revolving loans secured by junior claims on real estate on dwellings for 1-4
families.

Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs) (RCON5370)
All non-revolving loans secured by 1-4 family dwellings that pay floating or
adjustable rates.

Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) (RCON8639)
The sum of the bank’s holding of MBS held to maturity and held for sale. Those
held to maturity are valued at amortized cost; the MBS in the trading account are
recorded at fair market value.

Securitized and Alienated Assets with Recourse (RCFDB705 – B711, RCFDB790)
Outstanding balance of assets sold and securitized by the reporting bank or
another entity with servicing retained or other credit enhancements. The sale of real
estate loans, home equity lines of credit, credit card debt, auto loans, commercial and
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industrial loans are included. Includes the sale of loans to the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FANNIE MAE), the Federal Home Loan Association (FREDDIE MAC)
and other government-sponsored enterprises.
Credit Enhancements (RCFDB712 – B718, RCFDB797 – RCFDB803, RCFDC397RCFD406)
The amount of interest the bank secures, residual interest50 the bank retains and
guarantees provided to the purchaser of the asset.

50

Residual interest refers to the bank’s ownership of junior claims (tranches) to the cash flows generated by
the alienated assets.
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TABLE C
Sample Statistics
Variable

Mean

Standard

Maximum

Minimum

Error

Value

Value

Reserves

34220.12

1666.527

307

74296000

Assets

1146293

61268.19

14719

998466294

Deposits

747237.2

36041.32

11574

703361233

Liabilities

1004260

51386.07

11680

71761145

Real Estate Loans on

513596.2

25951.65

0

314646603

161074.8

11056.31

0

175890800

17787.49

1293.36

0

9605855

70125.85

5691.55

0

45448000

118644.6

7996.36

0

12166981

162979.1

33448.03

0

Balance Sheet
First-Lien Real Estate
Loans
Second-Lien Real Estate
Loans
Adjustable Rate
Mortgages
Mortgage Backed
Securities
Securitized Assets
(SEC)
Credit Enhancements

103565525
14813.36

2590.27

0

12312000

Ratio of CE to SEC

0.384

0.006

0

3.678929766

Exam Dummy

0.0557

0.003

0

1

11912.49

3320.01

-3497000

46324507

0.041

0.002

0

1

(CE)

Value of Mergers
Merge Dummy
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Appendix D
Chapter Three: Sample Description for Multinomial Logit

Table D1
Sample Description – Multinomial Logit
Variable

Min

Max

Mean

Std. Dev.

Loan Amount

1

47,625,000

171,593

223,690

Income

1

9,999,000

92,942

123,662

Loan Amount /

0.00396

417

2.23

2.93

67,700

775,000

244,540

130,527

Income
MSA Median
Home Price
Counts for Dummy Variables
Non-owner

43966

occupied housing
Refinance Loans

184164

HOEPA

318

Subordinate Lien

63816

Unsecured Loans

4115

FHA

12461

Total: 338,283 observations
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TABLE D2
Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logistic Regression of the Fate of Loan Applications
(1)
Application
Denied

(2)
Loan Sold
to Fannie
Mae

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Loan Amount

0.00003
(0.00005)

-0.00004***
(0.00001)

-0.00002***
(0.00001)

-0.0008
(0.0014)

0.00003**
(0.00001)

Income

-0.0002
(0.00016)

-0.00001
(0.00002)

-0.00002
(0.00001)

0.004
(0.0077)

-0.00006
(0.00004)

LoanAmount/
Income

0.10224***
(0.0076)

0.00117***
(0.00048)

0.0003
(0.00027)

0.000133
(0.00107)

-0.003
(0.0023)

No Recourse

-0.019***
(0.005)
0.163***
(0.0234)

0.00003
(0.00098)
-0.012***
(0.002)

-0.00004
(0.0007)
-0.005***
(0.002)

0.0000016
(0.00107)
-0.000188
(0.00135)

0.0042
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.005)

-0.024
(0.015)

0.002
(0.002)

-0.002*
(0.001)

-0.000663
(0.00034)

-0.0008
(0.003)

-0.27***
(0.015)

-0.0237***
(0.005)

-0.0126***
(0.003)

-0.00006***
(0.0000732)

-0.0227
(0.0233)

FHA

-0.083
(0.024)

-0.246***
(0.005)

-0.0145***
(0.004)

0.0055***
(0.00032)

-0.0342**
(0.0135)

Subordinate
Lien

0.065
(0.021)

-0.0526***
(0.0138)

-0.0381***
(0.0113)

-0.0002***
(0.000057)

-0.018
(0.014)

Unsecured
Loan

0.299***
(0.044)

-0.0325***
(0.007)

-0.0173***
(0.0046)

-0.00077***
(0.0000441)

-0.044***
(0.0161)

Median MSA
House Price

-0.0014***
(0.0002)

0.00001
(0.00003)

-0.00001
(0.0004)

-0.00001***
(0.000006)

0.00005*
(0.00003)

Mortgage
Company

0.0003***
(0.00004)

0.006
(0.015)

-0.006
(0.007)

-0.0007
(0.00001)

0.0685
(0.051)

Refinance
Loan
Non-Owner
Occupied
HOEPA
Status

(3)
Loan
Sold to
Freddie
Mac

N

(4)
Loan
Sold to
Ginnie
Mae

(5)
Loan sold
to Private
Secur
itizer

338,283

*** Coefficient significant at the 1% level; ** coefficient significant at the 5% level; *coefficient
significant at the 10% level
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Appendix E
Sample Description and Results for Nested Logit
TABLE E1
Outcomes by Year for sample used in Nested Logit Regression
2001-2006
Deny

64221

Originate

197648

Keep

80563

Sell

117085

Sell to GSE

62548

Sell to Private Inst.

54537

Sell to GSE

9249

Sell to Private Inst.

4523

Sell to GSE

12991

Sell to Private Inst.

6080

Sell to GSE

18294

Sell to Private Inst.

10248

Sell to GSE

8723

Sell to Private Inst.

10215

Sell to GSE

7182

Sell to Private Inst.

12667

Sell to GSE

6109

Sell to Private Inst.

10804

2001
Deny

9055

Originate

25571

Keep

11799

Sell

13772

2002
Deny

8255

Originate

31795

Keep

12724

Sell

19071

2003
Deny

10833

Originate

43960

Keep

15418

Sell

28542

2004
Deny

11240

Originate

31041

Keep

12103

Sell

18938

2005
Deny

12410

Originate

33926

Keep

14077

Sell

19849

2006
Deny

12428

Originate

31355

Keep

14442

Sell

16913
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TABLE E2
Outcomes by Year for sample used in Nested Logit Regression (proportions)
2001-2006
Deny

24.5%

Originate

75.5%

Keep

40.8%

Sell

59.2%

Sell to GSE

53.4%

Sell to Private Inst.

46.6%

Sell to GSE

67.2%

2001
Deny

26.2%

Originate

73.8%

Keep

46.1%

Sell

53.9%

Sell to Private Inst.
32.8%
2002
Deny

20.6%

Originate

79.4%

Keep

40.0%

Sell

60.0%

Sell to GSE

68.1%

Sell to Private Inst.

31.9%

Sell to GSE
Sell to Private Inst.

64.1%

2003
Deny

19.8%

Originate

80.2%

Keep

35.1%

Sell

64.9%

35.9%
2004
Deny

26.6%

Originate

73.4%

Keep

39.0%

Sell

61.0%

Sell to GSE

46.1%

Sell to Private Inst.

53.9%

Sell to GSE

36.2%

2005
Deny

26.8%

Originate

73.2%

Keep

41.5%

Sell

58.5%

Sell to Private Inst.
63.8%
2006
Deny

28.4%

Originate

71.6%

Keep

46.1%

Sell

53.9%

Sell to GSE

36.1%

Sell to Private Inst.

63.9%
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TABLE E3
Results of Nested Logistic Regression for 2% Sample for Years 2001-2006

(1)
2001

(2)
2002

(3)
2003

(4)
2004

(5)
2005

(6)
2006

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Coeff.
(se)

Income

0.004
(0.0004)

0.0004
(0.00001)

0.0003
(0.0001)

-0.0002
(0.00012)

-0.00011
(0.0001)

0.0009
(0.00018)

Loan Amount

0.006
(0.0002)

0.006
(0.00002)

0.0042
(0.0001)

0.003
(0.0001)

0.0026
(0.0001)

0.00077
(0.0001)

Loan
Amount/
Income

-0.0242
(0.0101)

-0.00234
(0.00048)

-0.0895
(0.0077)

-0.0796
(0.007)

-0.08107
(0.007)

-0.0514
(0.008)

Median MSA
House Price

0.001346
(0.0002)

0.00005
(0.00098)

0.00064
(0.0001)

0.00022
(0.0001)

0.0004
(0.00007)

0.00019
(0.00074)

Refinance
Loan

-0.0538
(0.0268)

-0.0534
(0.045)

-0.06411
(0.024)

-0.485
(0.0234)

-0.5169
(0.0219)

-0.4995
(0.022)

Non-Owner
Occupied

0.3542
(0.059)

0.3140
(0.0671)

0.215
(0.0466)

0.3072
(0.0433)

0.302
(0.039)

0.179
(0.038)

Mortgage
Company

-0.27
(0.015)

-0.314
(0.023)

-0.684
(0.0222)

-0.595
(0.022)

-0.2158
(0.0217)

-0.1653
(0.02214)

Black

-0.6445
(0.0523)

-0.494
(0.053)

-0.798
(0.0403)

-0.521
(0.0368)

-0.534
(0.033)

-0.6162
(0.0334)

West

0.03404
(0.02884)

0.04501
(0.0294)

0.03998
(0.0241)

0.0719
(0.0249)

0.1281
(0.023)

0.0684
(0.023)

138504
-44732.44

169534
-5632.77

219172
-72952.068

169124
-42281.234

185344
-61985.64

175132
-58107.01

N
LL
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FIGURE E4
Conditional Probabilities of Selected Outcomes of the Nested Logit Regression

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Origination
74%
79%
80%
73%
73%
72%

Keep
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

46%
40%
35%
39%
41%
46%

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Sell to GSE
67%
68%
65%
46%
36%
36%
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